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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article considers whether the law can or should protect 
speech on private college and university campuses. The easy answer 
is “yes.” After all, both public and private institutions are places of 
learning and inquiry. Therefore, at first, it might make sense for First 
Amendment-type protections to apply across the board—if not 
under the United States Constitution, then under state constitutions, 
     †  Assistant Professor of Legal Writing, Mitchell Hamline School of Law; J.D., 
William Mitchell College of Law; M.S.J., Northwestern University; B.A., Augsburg 
College. Before joining the law school, the author was a litigation attorney. Before 
becoming a lawyer, he was a newspaper journalist. The opinions are the author’s 
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common law, or statutes. Furthermore, the students who helped the 
Free Speech Movement spread nationwide in the 1960s and 1970s 
did not concern themselves much with legal distinctions between 
public and private,1 so why should the law? 
Using the law to protect speech on private college and university 
campuses becomes more difficult when considering what it takes to 
actually litigate a speech claim against a private school. As this article 
explains, there are several practical barriers to doing so, ranging 
from the settled status of the state action doctrine2 to the public 
policies that courts apply to bar claims that allege “educational 
malpractice.”3 In addition, some who advocate for First 
Amendment-type protections for private campuses may not have 
adequately considered the full scope of private educators. Today, 
private educators include not only Harvard, Yale, and their regional 
equivalents, but also for-profit online universities, which provide 
higher education to a disproportionate number of women and 
students of color,4 and sectarian schools, which are constitutionally 
permitted to regulate speech to fit their interpretations of religious 
doctrine.5 There has been little analysis of how speech law would 
apply, or not apply, to these schools. This article aims to provide such 
analysis. 
Minnesota provides a good analytical backdrop to this issue 
because it houses one of the nation’s largest for-profit online 
universities,6 and Minnesota has a wide array of private schools with 
varying sectarian ties.7 Minnesota is also where R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul arose,8 which prevents state actors—including those at public 
1. See infra Part III.A.
2. Id.
3. See Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 414–16 (7th Cir. 1992).
4. See infra Part II.C.
5. Kelly Sarabyn, Free Speech at Private Universities, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 145, 145
(2010) (“Private colleges . . . are not state actors, and thus, the First Amendment 
does not stop them from enacting self-restrictive policies.”). 
6. See Sarah Butrymowicz & Sarah Garland, For-Profit Universities: By the
Numbers, HECHINGER REPORT (June 2, 2011), http://hechingerreport.org/for-profit-
universities-by-the-numbers/; Contact Us, CAPELLA UNIVERSITY, http://www.capellae 
ducation.com/contact/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2018) (stating Capella 
University is located in Minnesota). 
7. Minnesota’s Private Colleges, MINNESOTA PRIVATE COLLEGE COUNCIL,
https://www.mnprivatecolleges.org/our-colleges (last visited Mar. 20, 2018) 
(describing all of the private colleges in Minnesota). 
8. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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universities—from enforcing policies that discriminate against 
viewpoints.9 Before jerking a knee toward a conclusion that R.A.V.’s 
principles should be extended to regulate private actors at private 
schools, it is worth considering the viewpoint of Robert A. Viktora 
(R.A.V.) in light of recent events. 
In 1990, R.A.V., age seventeen, burned a cross on the lawn of an 
African American family in St. Paul’s Dayton’s Bluff neighborhood.10 
Twenty-seven years later, college-aged men in Charlottesville, 
Virginia delivered a similar viewpoint—this time with burning 
torches—on the University of Virginia campus.11 Because the protest 
took place on public property, like the City of St. Paul, the University 
stood virtually powerless to stop it.12 A private university, whether 
nonprofit or not, would have been in a different legal position had 
the white supremacists’ rally happened there.13 
It is a sizable stretch to say anything good came out of 
Charlottesville, but the hateful display did provide opportunity to 
consider the question of what role, if any, First Amendment-type 
speech law can and should play on private property, such as private 
college and university campuses. Today, at least, the answer to that 
question might be one that free-speech advocates would rather not 
hear. 
With Charlottesville on the minds of so many, this article begins 
by discussing the current status of campus speech.14 It then recounts 
the state and federal cases and statutes that brought campus speech 
jurisprudence to its present state.15 Next, it explores barriers that 
disallow those cases and statutes from applying to private campus 
speech.16 This article concludes with thoughts on how education 
9. Id. at 378.
10. EDWARD J. CLEARY, BEYOND THE BURNING CROSS: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
THE LANDMARK R.A.V. CASE 3 (1994). 
11. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Brian M. Rosenthal, Man Charged After White
Nationalist Rally in Charlottesville Ends in Deadly Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/12/us/charlottesville-protest-white-nationalist 
.html. 
12. Jack Stripling, Report Faults U. of Virginia on Response to White-Supremacist
Rally, CHRONICLE HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 11, 2017), http://www.chronicle.com/articl 
e/Report-Faults-U-of-Virginia/241147 (“UVa was predisposed to defend 
constitutionally protected free speech, as long as violence did not break out.”). 
13. See infra Part III.A.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
3
Aggergaard: The Question of Speech on Private Campuses and the Answer Nobody
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2018
632 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:2 
about the use of free speech on private campuses is preferable to 
enacting or enforcing laws regulating the same.17 
II. WHERE WE ARE: THE STATUS OF CAMPUS SPEECH
A. Current Law and Current Concerns 
Although frequently misunderstood, the current law is that the 
First Amendment’s Speech Clause (coupled with the Fourteenth 
Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983) restricts only the actions of state 
actors at public colleges and universities.18 Federal law does not 
restrain administrators at private universities from infringing on 
speech any more than it restrains a private employer or homeowner 
from doing so.19 
There have been various proposals for filling the First 
Amendment gap between public and private institutions of higher 
education. The proposals include treating administrators at private 
institutions as state actors,20 using state constitutional or common 
law to enforce speech-protective provisions in student codes,21 and 
enacting statutes to legislatively impose First Amendment principles 
on private campuses.22 These ideas are intertwined with the real 
stories of the students who helped the Free Speech Movement 
spread to campuses nationwide. Some of that story is told in Part III 
of this article, which describes the current state of speech on college 
and university campuses.23 
The current state of free speech on college and university 
campuses is not particularly good, and what happened at the 
University of Virginia in August 2017 helps explain why. It is hard to 
forget the pictures—those of the steel-jawed men and women who 
felt empowered to march with torches and chant hideous slogans 
17. See infra Part V.
18. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS xi (Yale
Univ. Press 2017). 
19. See Erwin Chemerinsky, More Speech Is Better, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1639
(1998). 
20. See, e.g., Powe v. Mills, 407 F.2d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 1968).
21. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). 
22. See, e.g., Collegiate Speech Protection Act of 1991, H.R. 1380, 102d Cong.
(1991). 
23. See infra Part III.
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such as “Jews will not replace us.”24 For some, it was the latest 
confirmation of deep-seated hate.25 For almost everyone else, it was 
a wake-up call. When describing the torch-bearers, a writer in GQ 
Magazine practically described the stereotype of his audience: “the 
innocuous polo shirts; the trendy haircuts; the wireframe glasses.”26 
The march should not have been a surprise. Richard Spencer, 
the head of the white nationalist National Policy Institute, targeted 
colleges and universities the previous November.27 Charlottesville 
“only punctuated a dramatic spike in white supremacist activity on 
American campuses that has forced a reckoning among competing 
values: safety, free speech and a commitment to tolerance and 
diversity.”28 There were fears it would spread; as the 2017–2018 
academic year began, administrators at public institutions faced the 
reality that they had “few legal options in preventing offensive 
lectures from taking place, especially if a student group is affiliated 
with the event.”29 A new generation was learning about the power of 
the First Amendment, but they were also learning about its limits. As 
a writer in Teen Vogue explained, the hands of administrators at 
public universities “are largely tied, legally speaking, when it comes 
to First Amendment rights” because “they’re legally required to allow 
for the contentious discourse at the very least.”30  
24. Hawes Spencer & Sheryl Gay Stolbergaug, White Nationalists March on
University of Virginia, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/11/us/white-nationalists-rally- charlottesville-
virginia.html. 
25. See Chris Gayomali, Charlottesville and the Face of White Supremacy, GQ MAG.
(Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.gq.com/story/face-of-white-supremacy (describing 
white supremacy as an “enmeshed power” existing since America’s history of 
slavery). 
26. Id. (describing how the regular attire and indiscreet disposition of the
University of Virginia white supremacists indicates that white supremacists can be 
anywhere and blend in with the rest of society). 
27. Scott Jaschik, White Power Leader’s New Target: Colleges, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC.
(Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/11/28/white-
power-leaders-next-target-college-campuses. 
28. Emily Baumgaertner, After Charlottesville, Colleges Vow to Do Something. But
What?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/08/us/polit 
ics/colleges-racism-charlottesville.html. 
29. Dana Goldstein, After Charlottesville Violence, Colleges Brace for More Clashes,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/16/us/after-charl 
ottesville-violence-colleges-brace-for-more-clashes.html. 
30. Rachel Jacoby Zoldan, The Charlottesville Tragedy and White Supremacy: How
Colleges and Universities Have Responded, TEEN VOGUE (Aug. 15, 2017, 4:41 PM), 
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The same rules do not apply at private colleges and universities, 
a distinction that a few websites targeting students, such as the 
Student Press Law Center’s website, have tried to explain.31 But by 
and large, public institutions have dominated the conversation 
about free speech on campus.32 When private campuses are 
considered, they typically are seen through a public-school lens.33 
Two books, both titled Free Speech on Campus and published as 
the 2017–2018 school year began, reflect and reinforce the 
narrative.34 The first book, by Sigal R. Ben-Porath of the University 
of Pennsylvania’s Graduate School of Education, examined campus 
speech from an educator’s perspective.35 The second book, 
published eight weeks later, was co-authored by law professors Erwin 
Chemerinsky and Howard Gillman.36 The authors of the second 
book disclosed in the preface they would not treat private schools 
differently, even though the law does.37 
Consistent with the idea the law “should” be the same, students 
on private and public campuses have voiced viewpoints on topics 
http://www.teenvogue.com/story/university-presidents-respond-charlottesville-
racism. 
31. Kaitlin DeWulf, A Promise Unkept, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (Dec. 16, 2016, 2:14
PM), http://www.splc.org/article/2016/12/a-promise-unkept. 
32. See, e.g., Free Speech and Public Schools, CTR. FOR PUB. EDUC. (Apr. 5, 2006),
http://www.centerforpubliceducation.org/Main-Menu/Public-education/The-law 
-and-its-influence-on-public-school-districts-An-overview/Free-speech-and-public-sc 
hools.html (discussing freedom of speech issues at public schools at length, then 
tritely noting that “[p]rivate and parochial schools, however, are not similarly 
restricted by ideas of individual rights, free speech, and other liberties”). 
33. Cory A. DeCresenza, Note, Rethinking the Effect of Public Funding on the
State-Actor Status of Private Schools in First Amendment Freedom of Speech Actions, 59 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 471, 473 (2009) (“[S]ome authors have even written that 
differences between post-secondary public and private schools are fading in the eyes 
of the public at large.”); Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First 
Amendment Norms to the Private Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. 
REV. 1537, 1540–41 (1998) (discussing the confusion in First Amendment rights in 
terms of private and public organizations). 
34. See SIGAL R. BEN-PORATH, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS (Univ. of Penn. Press
2017); CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 18. 
35. See BEN-PORATH, supra note 34.
36. See CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 18.
37. Id. at xi (“Throughout this book, we rely on First Amendment law in
describing what public universities can and can’t do. But we draw no distinction 
between public and private schools when arguing for what they should and shouldn’t 
do.”). 
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such as race, gender, GLBT rights, and sexual assault.38 Many efforts 
in recent years have been positive, peaceful, and influential. For 
example, private liberal-arts schools in the Twin Cities have banded 
together to organize “Take Back the Night” rallies to advocate on 
issues surrounding rape and other sexual violence.39 The Minnesota 
Public Interest Research Group operates on private campuses and 
advocates for many causes as well.40 
Unfortunately, the disruptive and destructive efforts receive 
more attention than those carried out peacefully. For example, in 
May 2017, the Washington Post wrote about how students disrupted a 
forum at St. Olaf College in Northfield, Minnesota, that had been 
called to discuss a racist note found on a student’s windshield.41 
Earlier that academic year, the Star Tribune reported that University 
of Minnesota students received a “lesson in freedom of speech” when 
a Minnesota College Republicans’ mural was defaced with the words 
“Build the Wall” and when a month later, the Muslim Students 
Association’s mural was defaced with “ISIS.”42 The previous 
November, when controversial law professor Moshe Halbertal was 
shouted down during a speech at the university’s law school, a 
protester who was removed from the event learned the limits of the 
First Amendment, saying: “I was just chanting, you know. And, you 
know, in America, we have freedom of speech, and you know, you’d 
38. See, e.g., Free Speech at American Universities Is Under Threat, ECONOMIST (Oct.
12, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21730156-fears-
pandemic-snowflakery-are-overwrought-free-speech-american-universities 
(discussing various opinions on private and public university campuses). 
39. Take Back the Night a Success!, MINN. WOMEN’S CONSORTIUM (Oct. 30, 2012),
http://www.mnwomen.org/take-bac. 
40. MINNESOTA PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, http://mpirg.org (last
visited March 20, 2018). 
41. Peter Holley & Lindsey Bever, A Racist Note Sparked Protests at a Minnesota
College. The School Now Says the Message Was Fake., WASH. POST (May 10, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/05/10/a-racist-no 
te-sparked-protests-at-a-minnesota-college-the-school-now-says-the-message-was-fake 
The note ended up being a hoax. Id. 
42. Liz Sawyer, Graffiti Defaces University of Minnesota’s Muslim Student Association
Sign, STAR TRIB. (Nov. 3, 2016, 4:19 PM), http://www.startribune.com/graffiti- 
defaces-u-s-muslim-student-association-sign/399897391; Liz Sawyer, Vandalism of 
Pro-Trump Mural Offers Free-Speech Lesson at University of Minnesota, STAR TRIB. (Oct. 4, 
2016, 6:26 PM), http://www.startribune.com/vandalism-of-pro-trump-mural-offers-
free-speech-lesson-at-university-of-minnesota/395902471. 
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think that chanting would be allowed under, you know, the 
constitution, but apparently not.”43 
“Definitely not” is the appropriate response. Shout-downs are 
not protected speech, and vandalizing bridge murals is not free 
speech either.44 Unfortunately, the incidents in Minnesota were 
anything but isolated. During the 2016–2017 school year, disrupters 
heckled speakers at large public universities in Wisconsin, 
California, and Michigan and private universities, including 
Georgetown, Columbia, and Northwestern.45 Speakers on racial 
issues were shouted down at Middlebury College in Vermont and 
Claremont McKenna College near Los Angeles.46 The Middlebury 
incident, which stemmed from a speech by author Charles Murray,47 
epitomized the state of speech on private campuses. “Conservatives 
said that the students were intolerant, had engaged in mob mentality 
and were quashing free speech, while those on the left maintained 
that the speaker was racist and hateful and had no place on their 
campus.”48 Hundreds of alumni signed a letter protesting Murray’s 
presence, while the college’s president apologized to Murray and 
accused the disruptive students of violating college policy.49 
Such incidents prompted Stanley Kurtz, a conservative 
commentator, to proclaim 2016–2017 the “Year of the 
43. Michael McIntee, Israeli Ethicist Protested at University of Minnesota at 2:55–
3:05, YOUTUBE (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qav_7eXn5_Y; 
Maura Lerner, Protesters Disrupt Israeli Professor’s Lecture at University of Minnesota, STAR 
TRIB. (Nov. 4, 2015, 11:15 PM), http://www.startribune.com/protesters-disrupt-
israeli-professor-s-lecture-at-university-of-minnesota/340437581. 
44. See Sawyer, Vandalism of Pro-Trump Mural Offers Free-Speech Lesson at University
of Minnesota, supra note 42. 
45. Stanley Kurtz, Year of the Shout-Down: It Was Worse Than You Think, NAT’L
REV. (May 31, 2017, 9:48 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/448132/ye 
ar-shout-down-worse-you-think-campus-free-speech (detailing different shout-down 
events at universities across the country and the possible ramifications of these 
shout-downs). 
46. Howard Blume, Protesters Disrupt Talk by Pro-Police Author, Sparking Free-Speech
Debate at Claremont McKenna College, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2017, 10:20 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-macdonald-claremont-speech-disru 
upted-20170408-story.html; Katharine Q. Seelye, Protesters Disrupt Speech by “Bell 
Curve” Author at Vermont College, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2017/03/03/us/middlebury-college-charles-murray-bell-curve-protest.html. 
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Shout-Down.”50 Writing in The National Review, Kurtz described 
“increasing violence by a campus Left that has learned 
administrators will do nothing to stop it” and criticized 
administrators for “locking out conservatives and other controversial 
conservative speakers.”51 Receiving less attention was the backlash 
against speakers such as Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, an assistant 
professor of African American studies at Princeton University, who 
“received emails that promised [she] would be lynched, shot and 
raped” after Fox News aired a thirty-second segment of her 
criticizing Donald Trump.52 As she wrote in The New York Times, 
“[w]hat is shocking is that while the right-wing media is wringing 
its hands about suppressive leftists, openly racist and 
fascist-sympathizing organizations are recruiting young white people 
on campuses.”53 
B. Special Rules for Sectarian Schools 
Speech advocates across the political spectrum have looked to 
the law to protect speech on private campuses,54 but recently, 
conservatives such as Kurtz have taken the lead. He co-authored 
model legislation that served as a template for the Wisconsin 
Campus Free Speech Act, introduced in the spring of 2017 to 
mandate punishment for students who prevent speech from 
occurring at the state’s public universities.55 At this writing, at least 
nine other states have enacted or considered similar legislation.56 
50. Kurtz, supra note 45.
51. Id.
52. Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, The “Free Speech” Hypocrisy of Right-Wing Media,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/opinion/the-
free-speech-hypocrisy-of-right-wing-media.html. 
53. Id.
54. Cliff Maloney, Jr., Colleges Have No Right to Limit Students’ Free Speech, TIME 
(Oct. 13, 2016), http://time.com/4530197/college-free-speech-zone/ (detailing 
the national Fight for Free Speech campaign to reform unconstitutional speech 
codes and abolish free speech zones on college campuses). 
55. A.B. 299, 2017 Assemb., 103d Sess. (Wis. 2017); Stanley Kurtz, Jesse Kremer’s
Wisconsin Campus Free Speech Act, NAT’L REV. (May 2, 2017, 10:02 AM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/447260/jesse-kremers-wisconsin-campus-
free-speech-act-goldwater-proposal. 
56. Lauren Camera, Campus Free Speech Laws Ignite the Country, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (July 31, 2017, 5:40 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-
states/articles/2017-07-31/campus-free-speech-laws-ignite-the-country (noting that 
North Carolina, Colorado, Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia have such legislation and 
9
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A California legislator took the model legislation a step further 
by proposing the California Campus Free Speech Act, which would 
condition “some (but not all) state aid to private colleges and 
universities on compliance with the Act ([with] an exemption for 
private religious colleges).”57 The exemption reflects that under the 
First Amendment, schools with strong religious ties “can exercise 
religious freedom on an institutional basis, in the form of 
self-governance as well as in the ability to obtain exemptions from 
laws they and their members would otherwise have to obey.”58 Those 
laws would include the laws of free speech and free association.59 
For several years, speech about GLBT issues has been a 
particular target at some, but certainly not all, private colleges and 
universities. A 2011 story in the New York Times chronicled the 
suspension of a student at North Central University in Minneapolis 
for distributing flyers that provided information about a gay-support 
site, efforts by Harding University in Arkansas to block access to an 
online magazine “featuring personal accounts of the travails of gay 
students,” and Baylor University’s refusal to recognize a club 
opposed to homophobia.60 As a Baylor spokesperson told the Times, 
“Baylor expects students not to participate in advocacy groups 
promoting an understanding of sexuality that is contrary to biblical 
teaching.”61 
More recently, a 2016 article in The Nation magazine titled The 
Schools Where Free Speech Goes to Die singled out Baylor University, the 
University of Dayton, and Notre Dame University for not recognizing 
“atheist or humanist student organizations”; Liberty University for 
not recognizing the student Democratic club; and the University of 
St. Thomas in St. Paul for asking a visiting speaker to sign an 
agreement to not present or perform “material that is derogatory of 
the Catholic Church.”62 
California, Illinois, Michigan, Texas, and Wisconsin are considering similar 
legislative proposals). 
57. Stanley Kurtz, Melissa Melendez’s California Campus Free Speech Act, NAT’L REV.
(May 2, 2017, 1:16 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/447268/melissa- 
melendezs-california-campus-free-speech-act-goldwater-proposal. 
58. Elizabeth J. Hubertz, Loving the Sinner: Evangelical Colleges and their LGB
Students, 35 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 147, 160 (2017); see also infra Part III.C. 
59. Id.
60. Erik Eckholm, Even on Religious Campuses, Students Fight for Gay Identity, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/us/19gays.html. 
61. Id.
62. Katha Pollitt, The Schools Where Free Speech Goes to Die, NATION (Jan. 21, 2016),
10
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But the core concern has remained GLBT issues—specifically 
Title IX, the federal law banning discrimination “on the basis of sex” 
at colleges and universities that receive federal financial assistance.63 
Some schools fear “their sexual conduct codes might be threatened 
if Title IX’s anti-discrimination provisions were read to include 
sexual orientation as well as sex and gender identity.”64 “Prior to the 
Human Rights Campaign’s release of a report in December 2015, 
relatively few knew that religious exemptions to Title IX even 
existed.”65 The United States Department of Education is “highly 
deferential to the educational institutions claiming religious 
exemptions,” and the merits have not been litigated.66 “Virtually no 
scholarship exists on the subject, even within the abundant and 
well-developed recent theoretical work on broader questions of 
religious exemption.”67 
Concerns about the exemptions caused forty Democratic U.S. 
Senators, led by Democrat Al Franken of Minnesota, to urge the U.S. 
Department of Education to be more transparent.68 The 
Department did so on a website that, as of this writing, contained a 
“Religious Exemptions Index” with approximately 120 requests 
between 2009 and 2016.69 It was impossible to discern how many 
exemptions the Department has granted because the website 
provided data only through December 2016 and was identified as 
“Archived Information,” not updated since February 2017.70 
The advocacy group Campus Pride captured some of the data 
and incorporated it into a database that, as of September 2017, 
https://www.thenation.com/article/the-schools-where-free-speech-goes-to-die/. 
63. Id.; 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
64. Hubertz, supra note 58, at 149.
65. Kif Augustine-Adams, Religious Exemptions to Title IX, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 327,
327 (2016). 
66. Id. at 327–28.
67. Id.
68. Letter from Senator Al Franken et al. to John King, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Education (May 2, 2016), https://www.franken.senate.gov/ 
files/documents/160502SenateTitleIXLetter.pdf. 
69. Archived Religious Exemptions Index—2009-2016, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/z-index-links-
list-2009-2016.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2018). 
70. Id. After a congressman called for the data to be removed from the
internet, its continued availability became uncertain. See Letter from Senator James 
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included documentation from several dozen schools that received 
exemptions.71 According to the website, Minnesota-based Crown 
College and University of Northwestern requested and received Title 
IX exemptions.72 In their letters to the Department of Education, 
Crown College requested “freedom to respond to transgender 
individuals in accordance with its theologically-grounded 
convictions.”73 Similarly, the University of Northwestern stated the 
school does not “affirm or support transgender identity or 
expression” and that “any individual who violates campus standards 
for biblical living is subject to discipline, including expulsion.”74 
Some school codes restrain speech more explicitly, including 
when it occurs off-campus—particularly on GLBT issues. In her 
recent article, Loving the Sinner: Evangelical Colleges and Their LGB 
Students, Elizabeth J. Hubertz singled out provisions at sectarian 
schools that prohibit “defending or advocating a homosexual 
lifestyle,” “posting statements on social media promoting and 
celebrating homosexuality, adultery, and fornication etc.,” and 
participating in groups “that promote understandings of sexuality 
that are contrary to these biblical teachings.”75 Potentially, “a 
heterosexual student could be guilty of a conduct violation if he or 
she joined Campus Pride.”76 Although many such provisions would 
be unconstitutional if enacted at public universities, Hubertz 
observed that “[p]rivate religious colleges are for the most part free 
to place whatever restrictions on student speech they deem 
appropriate to their mission.”77  
Just because restrictions on speech are unconstitutional for 
public universities does not mean such universities have not tried to 
regulate speech. Since 2005, the Foundation for Individual Rights in 
71. Shame List: The Absolute Worst Campuses for LGBTQ Youth, CAMPUS PRIDE,
https://www.campuspride.org/shamelist (last visited Mar. 20, 2018). 
72. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 69.
73. Letter from D. Joel Wiggins, President, Crown College, to Catherine
Lhamon, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights 
(May 25, 2016), https://www.campuspride.org/wp-content/uploads/crown-
college-request-05252016.pdf. 
74. Letter from Alan S. Cureton, President, University of Northwestern, St.
Paul, to Catherine Lhamon, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of Education, 
Office for Civil Rights (Feb. 12, 2016), https://campuspride.org/wp-
content/uploads/university-of-northwestern-st-paul-request-02122016.pdf. 
75. Hubertz, supra note 58, at 188.
76. Id. at 189.
77. Id.
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Education, or “FIRE,” has featured “speech codes of the month” at 
both public and private institutions with limited or no sectarian 
ties.78 Codes at Southwest Minnesota State University, St. Olaf 
College, and Macalester College are among those that have been 
featured.79 FIRE defines a speech code as a policy “that prohibits 
expression that would be protected by the First Amendment in 
society at large.”80 Examples include bans on “offensive language” or 
“disparaging remarks” and policies that try to restrict protests and 
demonstrations to “free speech zones.”81 
Some codes restrict speech while including seemingly 
contradictory provisions promising that the school will protect 
speech.82 Student-advocacy groups such as FIRE and the Student 
Press Law Center view this discrepancy as warranting the use of 
contract law to hold private schools to the burdens of their 
bargains.83 But advocates for individual rights pay little attention to 
individuals at strongly sectarian schools; the common conception is 
that every student chooses a school and the restrictions that come 
with it.84 However, as Hubertz has demonstrated, some students who 
desire to speak out face the reality that their parents will only pay 
tuition at schools where speech is regulated in accordance with the 
institutions’ interpretations of religious doctrine.85 
78. Samantha Harris, Speech Code of the Month, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN
EDUC., https://www.thefire.org/category/newsdesk/speech-code-of-the-month 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2018). 
79. Id.
80. What Are Speech Codes?, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN EDUC.,
https://www.thefire.org/spotlight/what-are-speech-codes (last visited Mar. 20, 
2018). 
81. Id.
82. Kaitlin DeWulf, In Spite of Lip-Service Free Speech Codes, First Amendment Rights
Are Tenuous at Private Universities, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (Dec. 16, 2016, 2:14 PM), 
http://www.splc.org/article/2016/12/a-promise-unkept; Private Universities, 
FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS. IN EDUC., https://www.thefire.org/spotlight/public-
and-private-universities (last visited Mar. 20, 2018) [hereinafter Private Universities]. 
83. See DeWulf, supra note 82; Private Universities, supra note 82.
84. Eric Posner, Universities Are Right—and Within Their Rights—to Crack Down
on Speech and Behavior, SLATE (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_ 
and_politics/view_from_chicago/2015/02/university_speech_codes_students_are
_children_who_must_be_protected.html (“As long as universities are free to choose 
whatever rules they want, students with different views can sort themselves into 
universities with different rules.”). 
85. Hubertz, supra note 58, at 173–75.
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C. Profiting from an Online Revolution 
Advocates for extending speech law to private campuses have 
also overlooked the role that for-profit online educators play, 
particularly in providing higher education to women and students of 
color.86 Two of the largest such schools, Capella University and 
Walden University, are Minnesota-based and reflect this trend. As of 
December 31, 2016, Capella’s student body was 77% female and 51% 
students of color.87 Walden’s demographic data was comparable.88 
Walden awarded 682 doctorates to African American students 
between 2011 and 2015, “nearly twice the number awarded by 
second-place Howard University, a historically black university in 
Washington, D.C. Every other university lags far behind.”89 
Walden and Capella were among thirty for-profit online 
educators that Congress scrutinized in 2010–2012, schools a Senate 
committee report acknowledged as having “an important role to play 
in higher education” and creating “a ‘new American majority’ of 
non-traditional students.”90 Between 2001 and 2010, Capella’s 
enrollment grew more than tenfold from 3,759 students to 38,634.91 
Walden’s growth rate more than doubled that of even Capella, 
growing from 2,082 students in fall 2001 to 47,456 students in 2010.92 
By 2015, the combined enrollment of Capella and Walden outpaced 
all of Minnesota’s other private colleges, universities, career schools, 
86. GUILBERT C. HENTSCHKE, VICENTE M. LECHUGA & WILLIAM G. TIERNEY, FOR-
PROFIT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES: THEIR MARKETS, REGULATION, PERFORMANCE, AND
PLACE IN HIGHER EDUCATION 11–12 (Guilbert C. Hentschke et al. eds., 2010) 
(explaining that for-profit colleges and universities have provided “the labor market 
with a relatively high share of people of color”). 
87. Capella University Fact Sheet, CAPELLA UNIV. (July 26, 2017),
https://www.capella.edu/content/dam/capella/PDF/FactSheet.pdf. 
88. Walden Total Student Population and Demographics, Including Undergraduate
and Graduate, WALDEN UNIV. (2015), https://www.waldenu.edu/-/media/ 
Walden/files/about-walden/data/students/total-student-population-and-demogra 
phics-v-2.pdf. 
89. Jeffrey Mervis, Online University Leads United States in Awarding Doctorates to
Blacks, SCIENCE (Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/02/ 
online-university-leads-united-states-awarding-doctorates-blacks. 
90. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, & PENSIONS COMM., U.S. SENATE, FOR PROFIT HIGHER
EDUCATION: THE FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT AND ENSURE
STUDENT SUCCESS (2012). 
91. Id. at pt. II.
92. Id.
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and graduate and professional schools in growth by more than 2,000 
students.93 
The growth of for-profit online education comes at a sensitive 
time for both brick-and-mortar institutions and the future of free 
speech on college and university campuses. Tolerance for unpopular 
expression was lessening even before Charlottesville. The Higher 
Education Research Institute found that more than 70% of the 
incoming freshmen in the fall of 2015 agreed their schools “should 
prohibit racist/sexist speech on campus,” and around 43% agreed 
that colleges and universities had the “right to ban extreme speakers 
from campus.”94 A Gallup poll in March 2016 found that 69% of 
students believed colleges and universities should restrict “slurs and 
other language on campus that is intentionally offensive to certain 
groups.”95 Similarly, 63% of students favored policies that ban 
students from wearing costumes “that stereotype certain racial or 
ethnic groups,” and 28% believed students should be permitted to 
ban reporters from protests.96 The survey noted no discernable 
differences between public and private institutions.97 Indeed, none 
of the polls noted discernable differences between public and 
private institutions, which is not overly surprising given that the 
students who built the Free Speech Movement did not distinguish 
much between public and private campuses either.98 
III. HOW WE GOT THERE: THE PERILOUS PATH FROM CHICKASAW TO
ST. PAUL TO CHARLOTTESVILLE 
A. The Evolution of the State Action Doctrine 
A workable starting point for examining the Free Speech 
Movement’s spread to private campuses could be University of 
93. OFFICE OF HIGHER EDUC., ENROLLMENT AT A GLANCE (2016).
94. Kevin Eagan et al., The American Freshman: National Norms Fall 2015, COOP. 
INST. RESEARCH PROGRAM 47 (2016), www.heri.ucla.edu/monographs/TheAm 
erican Freshman2015.pdf. 
95. Free Expression on Campus: A Survey of U.S. College Students and U.S. Adults,
GALLUP 13 (2016), http://www.knightfoundation.org/media/uploads/publication 
pdfs/FreeSpeech_campus.pdf. 
96. Id. at 13–14.
97. See generally id. (noting the statistical differences between public and private
institutions). 
98. Id. (“Students at private (80%) and public institutions (77%) differ little in
their preference for an open college environment.”). 
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California-Berkeley, the public campus where the movement began 
in 1964.99 But to adequately consider how sectarian schools and 
for-profit online educators fit into the mix, a better starting point is 
the private company town of Chickasaw, Alabama, where Grace 
Marsh was arrested on Christmas Eve in 1943 for distributing 
literature consistent with her Jehovah’s Witness faith.100 
Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation owned Chickasaw and had a 
town code that banned solicitation without a permit.101 Ms. Marsh 
was convicted of trespassing.102 In 1946, her case reached the United 
States Supreme Court, which held that her individual right to 
distribute literature enjoyed a “preferred position” under the First 
Amendment.103 To the Supreme Court, Chickasaw’s private 
ownership was immaterial because Chickasaw served a “public 
function” and had “all the characteristics of any other American 
town.”104 
Marsh v. Alabama helped frame questions that would arise on 
private campuses in the decades to come. For example, when might 
an individual’s right to speak freely assume a preferred position that 
supersedes that of the private institution?105 Are campus codes legal 
when they implicate speech?106 Do private colleges and universities 
serve a “public function”?107 When might their administrators be 
considered state actors?108 
A form of the last question arose during the Civil Rights Era in 
the context of whether private institutions could choose students 
based on race. Some courts said yes, and others said no.109 In 1964, 
99. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 18, at 74–78.
 100. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Marsh v. State, 21 So. 2d 558, 560 
(Ala. Ct. App. 1945). 
101. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 503. 
102. Id. at 516. 
103. Id. at 509. 
104. Id. at 502–03, 506–07. 
105. See id. at 509. 
106. See Sumi Cho & Robert Westley, Critical Race Coalitions: Key Movements that 
Performed the Theory, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1377, 1381 (2000) (describing a campus 
speech code that sparked student protests at Berkeley). 
 107. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (holding that a private school 
educating maladjusted high school students serves a public function, but not one 
that was an “exclusive prerogative of the State”). 
108. Powe v. Mills, 407 F.2d 73, 82–83 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 109. Compare Guillory v. Admins. of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674, 687 (E.D. 
La. 1962) (finding a private university is not a state actor), with Hammond v. Univ. 
of Tampa, 344 F.2d 951, 951 (5th Cir. 1965) (finding a private university is a state 
16
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student concerns about race and race-based discrimination issues 
coalesced with concerns over military activities in Vietnam to 
famously start the Free Speech Movement at the University of 
California-Berkeley campus.110 
The catalyst for the movement was a campus code that regulated 
speech and curtailed recruitment by political organizations, a 
restriction that prompted students to protest in favor of the right to 
protest.111 Their nonviolent occupation of Sproul Hall at Berkeley 
resulted in the “largest mass arrest in California history” and “forever 
altered activism at U.S. colleges.”112 It also drew the attention of 
Ronald Reagan, then a candidate for California governor, who 
vowed to “clean up the mess at Berkeley.”113 Reagan was elected, 
“empowering a national conservative movement”114 that embraced 
the sorts of campus codes that FIRE, Stanley Kurtz, other 
conservatives, and some civil libertarians oppose today.115 
The Free Speech Movement was not limited to public campuses 
like Berkeley. At Harvard University in 1966, protesters shouted 
actor). 
 110. See Richard Gonzales, Berkeley’s Fight for Free Speech Fired up Student Protest 
Movement, NPR (Oct. 5, 2014, 7:57 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/10/05/353849 
567/when-political-speech-was-banned-at-berkeley; see also Richard Delgado, Liberal 
McCarthyism and the Origins of Critical Race Theory, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1505, 1525 (2009) 
(explaining how “unrest broke out at Berkeley and other U.C. campuses over free 
speech, civil rights, and the Vietnam War”); Kenneth Lasson, Controversial Speakers 
on Campus: Liberties, Limitations, and Common-Sense Guidelines, 12 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 
39, 43 (1999) (“The modern campus free-speech movement was born in 1964 at the 
University of California (Berkeley).”). 
111. See Cho & Westley, supra note 106, at 1381. 
 112. John Woodrow Cox, Berkeley Gave Birth to the Free Speech Movement in the 
1960s. Now, Conservatives Are Demanding It Include Them., WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/04/20/berkeley-ga 
ve-birth-to-the-free-speech-movement-in-the-1960s-now-conservatives-are-demandin 
g-it-include-them; David Margolick, After 30 Years, Return to Berkeley, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
5, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/12/05/us/after-30-years-return-to-
berkeley.html. 
 113. Larry Gordon, Graying Activists Return to Berkeley to Mark ‘64 Free Speech 
Protests, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-
me-berkeley-free-speech-20140928-story.html; CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 
18, at 76. 
114. Gordon, supra note 113. 
 115. Id. (“[A] video of Reagan’s 1966 campaign speech [shows him] advocating 
that protesters should be ‘taken by the scruff of the neck and thrown out of the 
university once and for all.’”). 
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down Defense Secretary Robert McNamara.116 At Columbia 
University in 1968, students occupied Hamilton Hall to protest the 
university’s involvement with weapons research and the school’s 
plans for a gymnasium with potentially segregated entrances.117 In 
1970, students gathered at Macalester College in St. Paul, Minnesota, 
to develop a “People’s Peace Treaty” that called for an end to the 
Vietnam War.118 The activism came at a confusing legal time. Marsh 
v. Alabama was good law, and in 1968 the Supreme Court extended
its scope by holding in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. 
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. that union members had a right to picket 
their employer in a privately-owned shopping mall.119 
Six months after Amalgamated Food, the Second Circuit 
considered whether a private university’s administrators were state 
actors when they punished students for speaking out against the war 
and racism in Powe v. Mills.120 The case arose when students at Alfred 
University, a private school in western New York, were disciplined for 
disrupting an R.O.T.C. ceremony on the university’s football field 
during Parents Day.121 Seven students were sanctioned under the 
university’s “Policy on Demonstrations.”122 The policy proclaimed 
that “[t]he University cherishes the right of individual students or 
student groups to dissent and to demonstrate,” but warned that 
“responsible dissent carries with it a sensitivity for the civil rights of 
others, and a recognition that other students have a right to dissent 
from the dissenters.”123 
 116. See Fox Butterfield, 29 Years Later, McNamara Is Given a Warmer Welcome, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 27, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/27/us/29-years-later-
mcnamara-is-given-warmer-welcome.html. 
 117. See Robin Shulman, At Columbia, Remembering a Revolution, WASH. POST (Apr. 
27, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/04/27/ 
ST2008042700138.html. 
 118. Randy Furst, Vietnam War Era Activists Reconvene at Macalester College, STAR
TRIB. (May 4, 2016), http://www.startribune.com/vietnam-war-era-activists-
reconvene-at-macalester-college/378033081. 
 119. 391 U.S. 308, 325 (1968) (quoting Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 
(1946)) (“The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by 
the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory 
and constitutional rights of those who use it.”), abrogated by Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 
424 U.S. 507 (1976). 
120. 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968). 
121. See id. at 77–78. 
122. Id. at 79. 
123. Id. at 85–86. 
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The state action issue was complicated because four of the 
students were in the Liberal Arts College, which the New York 
Legislature “incorporated as a private university in 1857,” and three 
were in the Ceramics College, which the state founded in 1900.124 
The court easily affirmed the suspensions of the Liberal Arts 
students, holding that “Alfred’s football field does not fit the rubric 
of either Marsh or Logan Valley Plaza; it was open only to persons 
connected with the University or licensed by it to participate in or 
attend athletic contests or other events.”125 But the court held the 
administrators at the Ceramic College acted under the color of state 
law because the state founded that college.126  
With the state action question unsettled, Chief Justice Earl 
Warren—the architect of the landmark Brown v. Board of Education 
opinion that desegregated schools—retired in June 1969, and 
Warren Burger began leading the Supreme Court rightward.127 
Meanwhile, the opposition to the Vietnam War was growing. On 
December 1, 1969, the Selective Service held its first lottery since 
1942 to determine who among college-aged men would be drafted 
for military service the following year.128 A wave of student activism 
followed, prompting another “conservative response” in the form of 
student conduct codes to establish “a standard of decency and 
respect in the academic community beyond that existing in society 
at large.”129 
The University of Minnesota adopted its Code of Conduct on 
July 10, 1970,130 a fateful date for Minnesota student activism. Late 
that evening, the “Minnesota 8,” several of whom had university ties, 
entered Minnesota Selective Service offices in Little Falls, 
Alexandria, and Winona, to destroy draft records.131 Two were 
124. Id. at 75. 
125. Id. at 80. 
126. Id. at 82–83. The Second Circuit affirmed the students’ discipline because 
they failed to provide notice for the protest as the Policy of Demonstrations 
required. Id. at 84. 
 127. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & LINDA GREENHOUSE, THE BURGER COURT AND THE RISE
OF THE JUDICIAL RIGHT 79–81 (2016). 
 128. The Vietnam Lotteries, SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, https://www.sss.gov/About 
/History-And-Records/lotter1 (last visited Mar. 20, 2018). 
129. See Eule & Varat, supra note 33, at 1591 n.234. 
 130. Board of Regents Policy, UNIV. OF MINN. 1, 1 (1970), 
https://regents.umn.edu/sites/regents.umn.edu/files/policies/Student_Conduct
_Code.pdf. 
131. United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697, 698 (8th Cir. 1972); David Hawley, 
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convicted.132 On appeal, Eighth Circuit Judge Gerald W. Heaney of 
Duluth, a “stalwart liberal” who played a key role in desegregation,133 
wrote an opinion affirming the convictions but giving the 
conscientious objectors every benefit of the doubt. “As legitimate as 
this technique may be,” Judge Heaney explained, “those who use it 
must risk the possibility that their tactics will be found inappropriate 
or the governmental action valid. The latter is the case here.”134 
Disruptive and destructive tactics were not limited to public 
universities. On the night National Guardsmen killed four students 
at Kent State University in Ohio, a protest that began at St. Louis’s 
private Washington University moved to Air Force and Army 
R.O.T.C. buildings, where fires were set.135 Again, the protesters were 
convicted,136 and again, Judge Heaney wrote the opinion affirming 
the convictions,137 but this time he warned that the Eighth Circuit 
stood ready “to protect constitutionally guaranteed activities or 
conduct from interference by either the State or private 
individuals.”138 
It was unclear whether those “private individuals” could include 
administrators at private colleges and universities. The question 
arose again at Washington University when students sued the 
chancellor, alleging he “refused to prevent the disruption of classes 
and educational activities by a small group of protesting students.”139 
In that context, the district court ruled the chancellor was a state 
actor because “[e]ducation is a public function.”140 But then in 1972, 
the Burger-led Supreme Court held in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner that 
there was no First Amendment right to distribute antiwar literature 
in a private shopping mall.141 
“Peace Crimes” Tells Minnesota 8’s War Story, MINNPOST (Feb. 21, 2008), 
https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2008/02/peace-crimes-tells-minnesota 
-8s-war-story. 
132. Kroncke, 459 F.2d at 698. 
 133. Dennis Hevesi, Gerald W. Heaney, a Judge Who Ruled for the Desegregation of 
Public Schools, Dies at 92, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2010), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2010/06/23/us/23heaney.html. 
134. Kroncke, 459 F.2d at 702. 
135. United States v. Mechanic, 454 F.2d 849, 850–51, 850 n.1 (8th Cir. 1971). 
136. Id. at 851. 
137. Id. at 857. 
138. Id. at 852. 
139. Belk v. Chancellor of Wash. Univ., 336 F. Supp. 45, 46 (E.D. Mo. 1970). 
140. Id. at 48. 
141. 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972). 
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The case did little to quench activism on private campuses. In 
1974, protesters shouted down President Richard Nixon’s chairman 
of the Model Cities Task Force at the University of Chicago.142 When 
William Shockley brought his theory of African American inferiority 
to Yale, Harvard, and New York University, he received rude 
welcomes.143 “As a result of its Shockley episode, Yale decided to 
reexamine its attitude toward freedom of speech.”144 A Yale 
committee studied “free expression, peaceful dissent, mutual respect 
and tolerance at Yale” and recommended the institution redouble 
its efforts to protect free speech by imposing “sanctions against 
disrupters.”145 
As one of the nation’s most influential private universities 
promised to discipline students for disruptive dissent, litigants 
argued federal law should apply to private colleges and universities 
that benefited from federal funds. The theory did not fare well in 
cases involving employment and anti-discrimination claims.146 In 
1973, the Second Circuit held administrators at Brooklyn Law 
School did not act under color of state law when they expelled two 
underperforming students who advocated against the Vietnam War 
and for racial equity.147 
Still, as the Vietnam War ended, it was unclear whether the First 
Amendment’s free speech principles would apply on private 
campuses. As late as 1977, the “nebulous character of state action” 
prompted the Minnesota Supreme Court to hold in Abbariao v. 
Hamline University School of Law that a law student stated a claim when 
 142. Robert Cassidy, University Professors Under Attack, CHICAGO TRIB. (Mar. 26, 
1974), http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1974/03/26/page/14/article/acade 
mic-racism. 
 143. Anthony Lewis, A Report on the Damages to the Right of Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 26, 1975), http://www.nytimes.com/1975/01/26/archives/a-report-on-the-
dangers-to-the-right-of-free-speech.html. 
144. Id. 
 145. Report of the Committee on Freedom of Expression at Yale, YALE U. (Dec. 23, 1974), 
http://yalecollege.yale.edu/deans-office/reports/report-committee-freedom-expr 
ession-yale; see also CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 18, at 156–57. 
146. See, e.g., Williams v. Howard Univ., 528 F.2d 658, 660–61 (D.C. Cir. 1976) 
(rejecting that acceptance of federal funding makes a school’s readmission decision 
a government action); Spark v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 510 F.2d 1277, 1279–83 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975) (discussing a decision to not provide a raise); Blouin v. Loyola Univ., 506 
F.2d 20, 20–22 (5th Cir. 1975) (discussing a decision to not renew a contract); 
Wahba v. N.Y. Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 97–104 (2d Cir. 1974) (discussing a decision to 
dismiss a research assistant). 
147. Grafton v. Brooklyn Law Sch., 478 F.2d 1137, 1143 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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he challenged his expulsion as “arbitrary” or “capricious.”148 In 1982, 
the United States Supreme Court all but resolved the question, 
holding in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn that administrators at a private 
secondary school—99% publicly funded—were not state actors 
when retaliating against a teacher for speaking her mind.149 Thus, 
the state action doctrine at the federal level became “a bright-line 
rule that the private institution always wins and the individual fired 
or disciplined by it for expression always loses.”150 There was no 
indication the Supreme Court would hold differently when students 
at private colleges or universities sought the First Amendment’s 
protection, so advocates for extending speech law had to look 
outside the United States Constitution. 
B. The Role of State Law in Filling a First Amendment Gap 
As the state action issue was litigated, the Vietnam War became 
a catalyst in suggesting the use of state law—common law, 
constitutional law, or a mixture of them—to protect speech on 
private campuses.151 Before the war, university discipline was justified 
on the idea that it was “part of the inculcation of institutional values 
into the student.”152 Even at public institutions, students “had few or 
no cognizable due process rights, and even summary expulsion was, 
in most cases, unchallengeable.”153 Then, students pushed back. 
From their perspective, permitting universities to discipline students 
on an in loco parentis theory was “nothing more than the justification 
offered by college administrators when other justifications 
fail[ed].”154 
A movement toward protecting students’ due process rights 
originated in 1971 when the Twenty-Sixth Amendment lowered the 
voting age to eighteen, reflecting the view that the draft age should 
148. 258 N.W.2d 108, 111–12 (Minn. 1977). 
149. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 832, 842–43 (1982). 
150. Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 1639. 
151. See The Twenty-Sixth Amendment: Resolving the Federal Circuit Split over College 
Students’ First Amendment Rights, 14 TEX. J. ON CIV. LIBERTIES & CIV. RTS. 27, 50–52 
(2008); Sarabyn, supra note 5. 
 152. Andrew R. Kloster, Student and Professorial Causes of Action Against Non-
University Actors, 23 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 143, 147 nn.27–29 (2013). 
153. Id. at 147–48. 
 154. Note, Common Law Rights for Private University Students: Beyond the State Action 
Principle, 84 YALE L.J. 120, 141 (1974). 
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match the voting age.155 Eighteen became the age of majority, and 
“as colleges became managed more like businesses, courts deemed 
the relationship between student and university as contractual in 
nature.”156 The law was murky. Although California courts 
recognized that a college or university’s written materials can 
become part of a contract,157 many other courts held a student 
“contracts away his right to due process.”158 Other courts were 
developing a due process cause of action based on the theory that 
students, even at private schools, had property interests in their 
educations.159 Still other courts were creatively melding 
constitutional and common law. For example, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in Abbariao v. Hamline University School of Law noted 
that “[t]he requirements imposed by the common law on private 
universities parallel those imposed by the due process clause on 
public universities.”160 
Then, state constitutions received a boost. Frustrated by the 
Supreme Court’s shift from protecting individual rights, in 1977, 
Justice William Brennan published a Harvard Law Review article in 
which he urged states to apply the “font of individual liberties” in 
state constitutions to protect rights, including speech rights.161 
There was and is a textual basis for doing so. Although the First 
Amendment (coupled with the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 
U.S.C. § 1983) reaches only state actors, the speech clauses in state 
constitutions “have a more affirmative cast” and do not explicitly 
reference state action.162 
The Minnesota Constitution’s free speech clause is typical of 
this “affirmative cast.” It states that “[t]he liberty of the press shall 
forever remain inviolate, and all persons may freely speak, write and 
publish their sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the 
abuse of such right.”163 The California Constitution’s provision is 
155. See Kloster, supra note 152, at 147–48. 
156. Id. 
157. Zumbrun v. Univ. of S. Cal., 25 Cal. App. 3d 1, 10 (1972). 
158. See Common Law Rights for Private University Students: Beyond the State Action 
Principle, supra note 154, at 143. 
159. See id. at 145–50. 
 160. 258 N.W.2d 108, 113 (Minn. 1977). New York’s highest court was among 
the courts to apply Abbariao favorably. See Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., 404 N.E.2d 1302, 
1305 (N.Y. 1980). 
161. Brennan, supra note 21, at 491, 502. 
162. Eule & Varat, supra note 33, at 1564. 
163. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
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similar.164 In Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, the California 
Supreme Court invoked the California Constitution’s provision to 
affirm the rights of high school students “to solicit signatures for a 
petition to be sent to the White House in Washington.”165 After the 
United States Supreme Court affirmed the holding,166 courts in at 
least five states applied state constitutions to protect speech rights in 
shopping malls, irrespective of state action, while most states, 
including Minnesota, did not.167 
Private colleges and universities were a different story. Supreme 
courts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey applied their state 
constitutions to protect speech at private schools—at least at political 
events open to the public. The Pennsylvania case arose at 
Muhlenberg College in Allentown, Pennsylvania, during a speech by 
then-FBI Director Clarence Kelley.168 The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court reversed the nonstudent protesters’ trespassing convictions, 
explaining that Muhlenberg “permitted the public to walk its 
campus freely,” held the event “in an area of the college normally 
open to the public,” and provided a forum for a “controversial public 
figure.”169 The New Jersey Supreme Court’s rationale was similar 
when it reversed the conviction of a nonstudent who sold political 
materials at Princeton University.170 The court focused on the 
“central purposes” of Princeton as articulated in the university’s 
documentation, which described free inquiry and free expression as 
“indispensable” to the university’s central purposes.171 
Meanwhile, courts narrowed the parameters of contract law. 
Although many courts were affirming the general idea that students 
could assert contract claims against schools, by 1992, many courts 
were barring claims that alleged “educational malpractice.”172 Courts 
cited public policy considerations, including “the lack of a 
 164. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“Every person may freely speak, write and publish 
his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A 
law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.”). 
165. 592 P.2d 341, 342 (Cal. 1979). 
166. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 75 (1980). 
167. Steven P. Aggergaard, Religion, Speech, and the Minnesota Constitution: 
State-Based Protections Amid First Amendment Instabilities, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 719, 
731 nn.64–65 (2006) (citing State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1999)). 
168. Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382, 1383–84 (Pa. 1981). 
169. Id. at 1390–91. 
170. State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 616, 630–31 (N.J. 1980). 
171. Id. at 630–31. 
172. Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 414–16 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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satisfactory standard of care by which to evaluate an educator,” 
difficulties in determining damages, students’ differing attitudes 
toward education, a potential “flood of litigation,” and fears that 
courts would micromanage higher education.173 To overcome the 
bar, a student had to “point to an identifiable contractual promise 
that the defendant [college or university] failed to honor.”174 
The use of contract law received a boost in 1998 when professor 
Charles Kors and litigator Harvey Silvergate published The Shadow 
University: The Betrayal of Liberty on America’s Campuses, which took aim 
at “verbal behavior” provisions in campus codes.175 The authors 
found restrictions at the University of Minnesota so egregious that 
“Minnesota really should have its own chapter.”176 Kors and 
Silvergate described “lesser known nonconstitutional avenues” for 
protecting speech on campuses, including contract law, but 
acknowledged “the outcome of litigation against a college may be 
uncertain.”177 
An “overwhelming response” to the book prompted Kors and 
Silvergate to form the Foundation for Individual Rights in 
Education, or FIRE.178 Advocates at FIRE have concluded that 
contract law “offers the best solution” to protect speech on private 
campuses because it “can protect the liberal ideal of universities as 
free speech institutions without sacrificing the right of private 
association.”179 
A year after The Shadow University was published, the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals adopted the educational malpractice bar in Alsides 
v. Brown Institute Ltd.180 In that case, the court held that a claim
against a school based on failure to provide “specifically promised 
educational services” is actionable, but one requiring 
“comprehensive review of a myriad of educational and pedagogical 
factors, as well as administrative policies” is not.181 Alsides 
173. Id. at 414 (internal quotations omitted). 
174. Id. at 416–17. 
175. ALAN CHARLES KORS & HARVEY A. SILVERGATE, THE SHADOW UNIVERSITY: THE
BETRAYAL OF LIBERTY ON AMERICA’S CAMPUSES 147 (The Free Press 1998). 
176. Id. at 174–78. 
177. Id. at 339, 345, 354. 
178. Mission, FOUND. FOR INDIV. RTS. IN EDUC., https://www.thefire.org/about-
us/mission (last visited Mar. 20, 2018). 
179. Sarabyn, supra note 5, at 146. 
180. 592 N.W.2d 468, 475 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). 
181. Id. at 472–73. 
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“corresponded with the great weight of authority in this country.”182 
By 2013, roughly two-thirds of the states recognized some sort of 
common law claim under which students could sue their schools, but 
the claims were generally subject to the educational malpractice 
bar.183 By 2017, the question of whether contract law could or would 
protect speech on private campuses still remained, in the words of 
Kors and Silvergate, “uncertain.”184 
C. From Stage Right, Enter the Statutes 
In The Shadow University, Kors and Silvergate discussed legislative 
efforts to extend First Amendment protections to campuses.185 By 
the late 1990s, there had been two such efforts—one federal186 and 
one in California.187 Both efforts were sponsored by legislators from 
the side of the political aisle that once favored speech-restrictive 
codes during the Vietnam War and Civil Rights Era.188 On the other 
side of the aisle, progressives were embracing the sorts of codes they 
loved to hate a generation earlier.189 
To understand the ideological shift, a good starting point is not 
a college or university, but instead the Dayton’s Bluff neighborhood 
of St. Paul where, on June 21, 1990, Robert A. Viktora (R.A.V.) 
pieced together a cross from broken chair legs and burned it on the 
front yard of an African American family.190 Prosecutors in juvenile 
court chose not to charge Viktora with a conduct-based crime, such 
as terroristic threats.191 Their tool was St. Paul’s Bias-Motivated 
Crime Ordinance, which made it a misdemeanor to use an object 
“which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, 
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, 
religion or gender.”192 
 182. Elizabeth A. Emerson, Comment, Rejecting Disgruntled Students’ Claims: A 
Modern Educational Theory, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 839, 860 (2000). 
183. Kloster, supra note 152, at 148–50 & nn. 32, 34–37. 
184. KORS & SILVERGATE, supra note 175, at 351–54. 
185. Id. 
186. Collegiate Speech Protection Act of 1991, H.R. 1380, 102d Cong. (1991). 
187. ANN. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367(c) (West 2009). 
188. See Eule & Varat, supra note 33, at 1591–92. 
189. FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, “SPEECH ACTS” AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1, 26 
(1993). 
190. CLEARY, supra note 10, at 3–4, 8. 
191. Id. at 10. 
192. Id.; see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379–81 (1992). 
26
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 6
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol44/iss2/6
2018] PROTECTING SPEECH ON PRIVATE CAMPUSES 655 
By its plain language, the ordinance criminalized only certain 
categories of speech, and its constitutionality was challenged. As 
R.A.V. worked through Minnesota courts,193 passions ran high on 
college and university campuses—private campuses included. 
Student commentator Evan G.S. Siegel set the scene in a 1990 law 
review comment: 
The same hostilities and conflicts that contribute to 
agitation on the campuses of the nation’s public 
universities also tear at the social fabric of private 
universities in the United States. On campuses from coast 
to coast—from Dartmouth College to Stanford 
University—discordance and mutual suspicion recently 
have characterized the nature of relations between whites 
and persons of color, men and women, and people of 
differing sexual orientations. Those tensions, often 
amplified on some highly politicized campuses, reflect the 
same social rifts afflicting contemporary American society 
as a whole.194 
As Siegel explained, “[n]ot since the 1960s have colleges and 
universities witnessed this kind of emotionally charged 
atmosphere—one that invariably has spawned a resurgence of 
heated debate in the campus dailies, political protests, speak-outs, 
and sit-ins.”195 Hundreds of public and private colleges and 
universities adopted student conduct codes, some of which directly 
implicated the right to speak freely.196 
It was a time “when the term political correctness first came into 
popular use and . . . campus communities, politicians, and the public 
at large grappled with issues ranging from campus hate-speech codes 
to social taboos regarding race and gender.”197 Civil libertarians 
fixated not on specific speech content but on the broader danger of 
authorizing the government to restrict speech, a danger judges also 
193. CLEARY, supra note 190, at 36–39, 56–59. 
 194. Evan G.S. Siegel, Closing the Campus Gates to Free Expression: The Regulation of 
Offensive Speech at Colleges and Universities, 39 EMORY L.J. 1351, 1378–79 (1990). 
195. Id. at 1355–56. 
196. See Jon Gould, The Triumph of Hate Speech Regulation: Why Gender Wins but 
Race Loses in America, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 153, 158 (1999); Steven R. Glaser, Sticks 
and Stones May Break My Bones, but Words Can Never Hurt Me: Regulating Speech on 
University Campuses, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 265, 267 (1992); Eule & Varat, supra note 33, 
at 1590–91; CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 18, at 82. 
 197. Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech, Higher Education, and the PC Narrative, 101 MINN. 
L. REV. 1987, 1992 (2017). 
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took seriously.198 “It did not take long after the rise of speech codes 
on campuses nationwide for plaintiffs to begin successfully 
challenging their constitutionality in court.”199 In 1989, the 
University of Michigan’s speech code became among the first to be 
invalidated.200 The University of Wisconsin’s “Design for Diversity” 
was struck down in 1991.201 “Between 1989 and 1995, every court that 
examined a university speech code found the code 
unconstitutional.”202 
Codes at private colleges and universities stood on different 
legal footing.203 The code at Brown University resembled the St. Paul 
ordinance by authorizing the discipline of students who engaged in 
“inappropriate, abusive, threatening or demeaning actions based on 
race, religion, gender, handicap, ethnicity, national origin or sexual 
orientation.”204 Applying the code in 1991, Brown expelled Douglas 
Hann, a varsity football player, for shouting “anti-black, anti-Semitic 
and antihomosexual remarks” in a campus courtyard.205 “I think it 
is, of course, a case of free speech,” Hann told the New York Times 
shortly thereafter.206 
To a constitutional lawyer, Hann was wrong because 
administrators at Brown University were not state actors and the 
Rhode Island courts could not apply the state constitution’s speech 
clause to restrain private actors.207 But to Henry Hyde, a Republican 
Congressman from Illinois, Hann was right. Hyde saw speech codes 
 198. See Azhar Majeed, Defying the Constitution: The Rise, Persistence, and Prevalence 
of Campus Speech Codes, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 481, 488–93 (2009). 
199. Id. at 488. 
 200. Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Majeed, supra 
note 198, at 488–89. 
201. UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System, 774 F. Supp. 1163 
(E.D. Wis. 1991); Majeed, supra note 198, at 149. 
202. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 18, at 100–01. 
 203. Majeed, supra note 198, at 490 (identifying Stanford University’s code as 
“the first (and to date only)” code to be judicially invalidated, but under the 
“Leonard Law”). 
204. Student at Brown Is Expelled Under a Rule Barring “Hate Speech,” N.Y. TIMES 




207. Cf. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837 (1982) (explaining that 
constitutional protection of free speech applies to government acts, “not to acts of 
private persons or entities”). 
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“as abhorrent at private institutions as they are at public ones.”208 
Hyde denounced Brown and proposed the Collegiate Speech 
Protection Act of 1991 to specifically extend the First Amendment’s 
speech clause to any “postsecondary educational institution” and to 
provide injunctive and declaratory relief as well as recovery of a 
prevailing plaintiff’s attorney fees..209 
The bill received support “across the political spectrum, from 
Barney Frank to Newt Gingrich”210 and from the American Civil 
Liberties Union.211 But there was a catch. Hyde’s bill exempted “an 
educational institution that is controlled by a religious organization, 
to the extent that the application of this section would not be 
consistent with the religious tenets of such organization.”212 Hyde’s 
bill effectively put sectarian institutions in the “preferred position” 
that would apply to an individual like Grace Marsh on the private 
streets of Chickasaw.213 
In 1992, Bill Leonard, a Republican Senator from California, 
proposed state legislation resembling the Collegiate Speech 
Protection Act, which like Hyde’s bill, targeted speech codes, 
exempted religious institutions, and received broad support, 
ranging from the ACLU to College Republicans.214 Unlike Hyde’s 
bill, which died in committee, Leonard’s bill “eventually won over 
nearly everyone,” passed both state houses almost unanimously, and 
was signed into law in September 1992, complete with the exemption 
for “a private postsecondary educational institution that is controlled 
by a religious organization.”215 
 208. Henry J. Hyde & George M. Fishman, The Collegiate Speech Protection Act of 
1991: A Response to the New Intolerance in the Academy, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 1469, 1493 
(1991). 
 209. Collegiate Speech Protection Act of 1991, H.R. 1380, 102d Cong. (1991); 
Janet Bass, Hyde, ACLU Join to Protect Campus Free Speech Rights, UNITED PRESS INT’L 
(Mar. 13, 1991), http://www.upi.com/Archives/1991/03/13/Hyde-ACLU-join-to-
protect-campus-free-speech-rights/2967668840400. 
210. Eule & Varat, supra note 33, at 1594 n.245. 
 211. Bass, supra note 209 (“Hyde and the American Civil Liberties Union said 
they feel the First Amendment should apply to private schools.”); KORS & 
SILVERGATE, supra note 175, at 351 (“Hyde . . . joined with the American Civil 
Liberties Union . . . to introduce the Collegiate Speech Protection Act of 1991.”). 
212. H.R. 1380, 102d Cong. (1991). 
213. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946). 
214. Eule & Varat, supra note 33, at 1591–92, 1594 n.245, 1597. 
215. Id. at 1592, 1594 n.245; CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367(c) (West 2009). The 
California Court of Appeal has affirmed the Leonard Law’s constitutionality on the 
grounds that it does not infringe the constitutional right to petition for redress of 
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The code at Stanford University, an institution not controlled 
by a religious organization, “was the first victim of the Leonard 
Law.”216 The code, adopted two years before the law’s enactment, 
also resembled St. Paul’s ordinance because it specified instances 
when use of racial epithets “would be viewed as harassment by 
personal vilification.”217 Civil libertarian and columnist Nat Hentoff 
praised the ruling as giving “encouragement to students at private 
universities around the country.”218 He predicted that “Stanford’s 
defeat is likely to affect private and public colleges in other states.”219 
Stanford president Gerhard Casper, a law professor himself and 
a former editor of The Supreme Court Review,220 was puzzled by the 
California trial court’s ruling. “I thought the First Amendment 
freedom of speech and freedom of association is about the pursuit 
of ideas,” he stated at the time.221 “Stanford, a private university, had 
the idea that its academic goals would be better served if students 
never used gutter epithets against fellow students. The California 
legislature apparently did not like such ideas, for it prohibited 
private secular universities and colleges from establishing their own 
standards of civil discourse.”222 Casper was among the few to explain 
that nonsectarian private universities were being treated differently 
than sectarian ones. “Religious institutions alone can claim First 
Amendment protection in this regard,” he stated.223 “The San 
Francisco Examiner called my position a ‘laughable convolution,’” 
Casper lamented.224 “I guess the Examiner must be right.”225  
grievances and “creates statutory free speech rights for students of private 
postsecondary educational institutions.” Yu v. Univ. of La Verne, 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
763, 772 (2011). 
 216. Eule & Varat, supra note 33, at 1595 (explaining the effect of the Leonard 
Law on Stanford’s policy on free express and discriminatory harassment). 
 217. Press Release, Stanford University News Service, Statement on Corry vs. 
Stanford University President Gerhard Casper, Stanford University Faculty Senate 
(Mar. 9, 1995), http://news.stanford.edu/pr/95/950309Arc5331.html. 




 220. Gerhard Casper: President Emeritus of Stanford University, STAN. U., 
https://gcasper.stanford.edu (last visited Mar. 20, 2018). 
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By the time of Casper’s criticism in the San Francisco press, the 
United States Supreme Court had issued its opinion in R.A.V., and it 
left Minnesota’s capital city and much of the nation puzzled and 
angry.226 All nine Justices agreed St. Paul’s ordinance was facially 
unconstitutional, but they differed sharply on why.227 Writing for a 
five-member majority, Justice Antonin Scalia explained that by 
singling out “specified disfavored topics,” the City Council had 
engaged in content-based and viewpoint discrimination that failed 
to satisfy strict scrutiny.228 “Let there be no mistake about our belief 
that burning a cross in someone’s front yard is reprehensible,” Scalia 
wrote. “But St. Paul has sufficient means at its disposal to prevent 
such behavior without adding the First Amendment to the fire.”229 
Four Justices, including Harry Blackmun, who grew up with 
Chief Justice Burger blocks from where the cross-burning 
occurred,230 believed St. Paul’s ordinance was unconstitutionally 
overbroad.231 “Although the ordinance as construed reaches 
categories of speech that are constitutionally unprotected, it also 
criminalizes a substantial amount of expression that—however 
repugnant—is shielded by the First Amendment,” Justice Byron 
White wrote.232 “The mere fact that expressive activity causes hurt 
feelings, offense, or resentment does not render the expression 
unprotected.”233 
Still, the result was clear. R.A.V. restricted state actors from 
enforcing codes that regulated expression based on viewpoint.234 
The Minnesota case “created a Catch-22” because public campus 
codes that punished “fighting words in general” would be invalidated 
as “too broad and vague,” while codes that focused on certain 
categories of words covered “too little” speech.235 R.A.V. effectively 
invalidated similar campus speech codes at public universities.236 
226. CLEARY, supra note 190, at 200–01. 
227. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
228. Id. at 391–93. 
229. Id. at 396. 
230. LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN 5–6 (2005). 
231. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 413–14 (White, J., concurring). 
232. Id. at 413. 
233. Id. at 414. 
234. Id. at 413–14. 
235. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 18, at 95. 
236. See Eule & Varat, supra note 33, at 1591 n.232; Kitrosser, supra note 197, at 
2005–06. See generally KORS & SILVERGATE, supra note 175, at 47 (stating that the 
majority of colleges have “verbal behavior” requirements in their codes). 
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Consistent with the reality that public and private schools often are 
lumped together for free-speech purposes, R.A.V.’s effects were felt 
even at private institutions, including Drake University in Des 
Moines and Macalester College in St. Paul.237 But legally speaking, 
R.A.V. solidified a First Amendment wall between public and private 
institutions.238  
The internet and proliferation of social media helped 
strengthen the legal separation. Even speech occurring off-campus 
was at risk and subject to differential treatment.239 For example, after 
a Regent University law student was disciplined for posting a 
YouTube screen grab of university president Pat Robertson “flipping 
the bird,” the student’s First Amendment lawsuit was dismissed in 
2009 on a motion for summary judgment.240 In stark contrast, after 
a University of Minnesota Mortuary Sciences student was disciplined 
for writing Facebook posts about her experience working with a 
cadaver, her First Amendment-based claim received a hearing before 
the Minnesota Supreme Court in 2012.241 
The differential treatment did not deter activists at private 
colleges and universities from speaking out—or, as explained in Part 
II, from attempting to prevent others from doing so. Activism at 
private institutions helped prompt Stanley Kurtz to proclaim 2016–
2017 the “year of the shout-down,” and California legislator Melissa 
Melendez to propose the California Campus Free Speech Act.242 The 
bill drew comment about the “‘great irony’ that California, the 
birthplace of the Free Speech Movement at UC Berkeley in the 1960s 
237. See Kitrosser, supra note 197, at 2006, 2010. 
 238. In 1998, Congress amended the Higher Education Act to articulate the 
“sense of Congress” that both public and private institution students’ “participation 
in protected speech or protected association” should not affect their participation 
in educational programs. See 20 U.S.C. § 1011a(a)(1). The statute contains an 
exception for “any constitutionally protected religious liberty, freedom, expression, 
or association.” 20 U.S.C. § 1011a(a)(2)(F) (2012). In addition, “it appears clear as 
a matter of law that the Higher Education Act does not provide any express or 
implied private rights of action for violations of its provisions.” Key v. Robertson, 
626 F. Supp. 2d 566, 580 (E.D. Va. 2009) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1011a). 
239. See CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 18, at 95; Eule & Varat, supra note 
33, at 1591 n.232; Kitrosser, supra note 197, at 2005–06, 2010; KORS & SILVERGATE,
supra note 175, at 47. 
240. Key, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 570. 
241. See Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Minn. 2012). 
242. See supra Part II; Kurtz, supra note 45. 
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and 1970, is now facing scrutiny over how students can express 
themselves on campus.”243 
Melendez’s act is the most notable development in campus 
speech as this article is being published. The legislation conditioned 
funding to colleges and universities, including private ones, on 
whether they “develop and adopt a policy on free expression” and 
form “a Committee on Free Expression.”244 The bill contained a 
familiar exception for schools that claim application of the statute 
would be inconsistent with “religious tenets of that organization.”245 
Meanwhile, as the 2017–2018 school year began, administrators 
at public colleges and universities feared the message of hate at the 
University of Virginia would spread to other public campuses and 
that a cross-burning case with its origins in the Dayton’s Bluff 
neighborhood of St. Paul would prevent state actors from doing 
much about it.246 
IV. WHY EXTENDING SPEECH LAW WILL NOT WORK: PRACTICAL
BARRIERS 
California Republicans are far from alone in seeking lawful ways 
to protect speech on private campuses. As explained in Part III, even 
Justice Brennan suggested a constitutional solution, albeit a state 
constitutional one.247 FIRE and the Student Press Law Center pin 
hopes on contract law.248 Meanwhile, the idea lingers that federal 
courts might declare private-school administrators to be state 
actors.249 This Part explains why it is false hope to expect the law to 
protect or regulate speech on private campuses.  
 243. Melanie Mason, Frustrated with Campus Discourse Limits, California 
Republicans Take on “Free Speech Zones,” L.A. TIMES (May 24, 2017), 
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-free-speech-zones-20170524story.html. 
 244. Cal. Leg. ACA 14, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007), https://leginfo.legislature. 
ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180ACA14. 
245. Id. 
 246. See, e.g., Riley Snyder, UNR Can’t Expel or Fire White Nationalist Student 
Photographed at Charlottesville Demonstration, NEV. INDEP. (Aug. 15, 2017), 
https://thenevadaindependent.com/preview?post_type=article&p=9743&preview
=true&preview_id=9743. 
247. See Brennan, supra note 21. 
248. See DeWulf, supra note 82. 
249. Cf. Eule & Varat, supra note 33, at 1595 (demonstrating how private, 
non-religious institutions like Stanford are already vulnerable to scrutiny under the 
Leonard Law). 
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A. The State Action Doctrine is Too Settled 
From Harvard to St. Olaf to Claremont McKenna College, it is 
apparent that “[r]emarkably few, other than lawyers,” care much 
about the state action doctrine.250 To be sure, “most academics, and 
indeed just about everyone else, share the general intuition that 
there is not much of a difference between public and private 
universities on a day-to-day basis.”251 
The recent publications of the books Free Speech on Campus 
reflect and reinforce this reality. Although neither book specifically 
advocates for the First Amendment to protect speech on private 
campuses, both are infused with the idea that free-speech principles 
“should” apply there. As Professor Ben-Porath wrote: “It is easy to 
agree that the First Amendment provides historic, legal, and political 
contexts that should be respected and protected.”252 As Professors 
Chemerinsky and Gillman put it: “Although the First Amendment 
applies only to public universities, all colleges and universities should 
commit themselves to these values.”253 
As early as 1989, Chemerinsky was articulating that public and 
private schools both “perform an essential public function” and 
therefore “should be obligated to follow the United States 
Constitution.”254 He suggested the remedy was “to declare that 
private schools perform an essential public function and must 
comply with the Constitution.”255 He voiced similar views in a 1998 
essay, More Speech Is Better, explaining “government-imposed 
orthodoxy on private institutions often is a good thing,” as with laws 
prohibiting race and gender discrimination.256 
Brian Steffen, a communications professor at Simpson College 
in Indianola, Iowa, provided a similar view from an educator’s 
perspective, observing that it is “difficult to argue private higher 
education does not fulfill a public function in American society.”257 
250. Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 1638. 
 251. Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers 
and Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1525 (2007). 
252. BEN-PORATH, supra note 34, at 69. 
253. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 18, at 20. 
254. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Private Schools, in PUBLIC VALUES,
PRIVATE SCHOOLS 275 (Neil L. Devins, ed., 1989). 
255. Id. at 286. 
256. Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 1637. 
257. Brian J. Steffen, Freedom of the Private-University Student Press: A Constitutional 
Proposal, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 139, 157 (2002). 
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Steffen advocated for “qualified First Amendment protection for 
student journalists” at private schools258 and argued that, from a 
student’s perspective, “there are legitimate public policy reasons, 
including natural justice and fair play, for making constitutional 
standards obligatory on private colleges and universities.”259 
Students at private schools are more likely to receive federal aid than 
their public-school counterparts,260 so it is not far-fetched to expect 
federal law to regulate speech. 
But asking a federal court to “declare” that they can regulate 
speech on private campuses is difficult. A declaration must be 
supported by precedent, so arguing what the law “should” be will not 
survive Rule 12, let alone Rule 11.261 The settled precedent is 
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, a case in which teachers unsuccessfully asserted 
First Amendment claims against their private school, which received 
up to 99% of its revenue from the state to educate struggling 
students who could not attend public schools.262 The Supreme Court 
did not follow the money in that specific case. Instead, it fixated on 
the nature of education in general, holding that education was not 
the “exclusive prerogative of the State.”263 There is no sign the 
Supreme Court would feel differently about private postsecondary 
institutions as a group. 
Maybe in a specific circumstance an argument could be made 
that a private college or university administrator is a state actor. As 
explained in Part III, during the Vietnam War, the Eighth Circuit 
stood ready “to protect constitutionally guaranteed activities or 
conduct from interference by either the State or private 
individuals,”264 and the Second Circuit held that administrators at a 
private university were state actors when they acted on behalf of a 
258. Id. at 142. 
259. Siegel, supra note 194, at 1387. 
260. See Cory A. DeCresenza, Rethinking the Effect of Public Funding on the 
State-Actor Status of Private Schools in First Amendment Freedom of Speech Actions, 59 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 471, 474, 482 (2009). 
 261. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (explaining dismissal for failure to state a 
claim); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2) (explaining that by filing a document, a lawyer 
certifies, “the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by 
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing 
existing law or for establishing new law”). 
262. 457 U.S. 830, 832 (1982). 
263. Id. at 842 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)). 
264. United States v. Mechanic, 454 F.2d 849, 852 (8th Cir. 1971). 
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college founded by the state of New York.265 Today, a plaintiff who 
alleges private university security guards are state actors on grounds 
that they also are “sworn police officers” might overcome Rule 12.266 
A public university cannot contract away its free-speech obligations 
by hosting a controversial event on a private campus any more than 
a city can exclude all expressive activity at a city park by leasing it to 
a private actor.267 Thus, even today, the line between public and 
private can be fuzzy. 
In addition, Marsh v. Alabama remains good law268 and provides 
some support for extending federal speech law to private 
campuses.269 “Marsh and the shopping-center cases clearly establish 
that some private properties fulfill public functions amenable to 
constitutional protection,”270 and arguably, private campuses are 
among them.271 There also is room to argue that Marsh has exceeded 
its bounds and is infringing the rights of individual students who 
would like to speak out on their sectarian campuses—or just on 
Facebook—but risk expulsion if they do so.272 
Chemerinsky saw federal regulation of private campus speech 
coming. He warned nearly three decades ago: “Although the state 
action doctrine may be desirable in preserving a zone of individual 
freedom exempt from government control, there is no reason why 
an institution, such as a private school, should have such 
immunity.”273 Immunity is effectively what sectarian institutions 
receive by and through the Title IX exemptions that permit them to 
maintain and enforce codes that regulate expression on GLBT issues 
and viewpoints. At private institutions, the Department of Education 
265. Powe v. Mills, 407 F.2d 73, 82 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 266. Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., No. 4:11-cv-1679, 2012 WL 1569826, at *3–4 
(M.D. Pa. May 3, 2012) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss claims). 
267. Gay-Lesbian-Bisexual-Transgender Pride/Twin Cities v. Minneapolis Park 
& Rec. Bd., 721 F. Supp. 2d 866, 873 (D. Minn. 2010). 
 268. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). Although Marsh has not been cited 
in a United States Supreme Court majority opinion since 1991, it has not been 
overruled. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 640 (1991). 
269. Marsh, 326 U.S. 501 at 278–79. 
270. Steffen, supra note 257, at 157. 
271. See Alysa Freeman, Go to the Mall with My Parents?: A Constitutional Analysis 
of the Mall of America’s Juvenile Curfew, 102 DICK. L. REV. 481, 488–89, 503–04 
(describing how Marsh and other mall speech cases have both complemented and 
been informed by various private campus speech cases). 
272. Sarabyn, supra note 5, at 147. 
273. Chemerinsky, supra note 254, at 281. 
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has facilitated the sort of viewpoint discrimination that R.A.V. forbids 
at public institutions, casting serious doubt on the viability of any 
branch of the government—regardless of ideology or party 
control—to regulate speech on private campuses.274  
The role of for-profit online educators introduces a new twist, 
one that commentators have not had opportunity to examine. The 
recent events in Charlottesville demonstrate that sometimes, albeit 
perhaps rarely, private entities—even for-profit ones—play 
meaningful roles in the marketplace of ideas and association. For 
example, before Charlottesville, “the lodging rental company 
Airbnb quietly booted users who it believed were searching for 
lodging to attend the rally.”275 Afterward, GoDaddy and Google 
refused to play host to the white supremacist website The Daily 
Stormer.276 Turning for-profit educators into state actors could strip 
those institutions and their nonsectarian nonprofit cousins of means 
to tame hate in ways the government cannot. 
B. Using State Constitutional or Contract Law Is Practically Impossible 
Apart from the state action doctrine is the idea that state law can 
and should regulate campus speech in ways federal judges cannot. 
Indeed, “state courts are free to use a more inclusive conception to 
enforce their state constitutional guarantees.”277 Justice Brennan 
voiced the same view in his 1977 Harvard Law Review article.278 But 
to date, only the Pennsylvania and New Jersey supreme courts have 
used state constitutions to protect speech on private campuses and 
only in the narrow context of political events held open to the 
 274. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); see also Schumacher v. 
Argosy Educ. Group, Inc., Civ. No. 05-531, 2006 WL 3511795 (D. Minn. Dec. 6, 
2006) (denying relief to a student expelled from the university for expressing that 
a student lounge should have less GLBT materials). 
 275. Kyle Swenson, Airbnb Boots White Nationalists Headed to “Unite the Right” Rally 
in Charlottesville, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/new 
s/morning-mix/wp/2017/08/08/airbnb-boots-white-nationalists-headed-to-unite-
the-right-rally-in-charlottesville. 
 276. Katie Mettler & Avi Selk, GoDaddy—Then Google—Ban Neo-Nazi Site Daily 




 277. Comment, Private Abridgment of Speech and the State Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J. 
165, 183 (1980). 
278. Brennan, supra note 21, at 502–03. 
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public.279 Subsequently, the Pennsylvania court held the state 
constitution did not prevent a private shopping mall from excluding 
all political speech,280 and it is hard to see how the same rule would 
not apply at private colleges and universities. The rest of the states 
simply have not taken Justice Brennan’s advice to use state 
constitutions to protect speech on college campuses. 
Efforts to mix constitutional law with the common law offer little 
help. Abbariao v. Hamline School of Law, in which the Minnesota 
Supreme Court created a cause of action for a student who alleged 
his expulsion was “arbitrary” or “capricious,” remains good law but 
has been applied narrowly.281 For example, in Schumacher v. Argosy 
Education Group, Inc., a federal court rejected an Abbariao-based claim 
of an evangelical Christian who was expelled from his doctor of 
psychology program after expressing views that a student lounge 
should have fewer GLBT materials.282 The student was expelled for 
failure to show “social awareness and social sensitivity,” which the 
court held was a permissible academic reason to prevent relief under 
Abbariao.283 
The student also pleaded breach of contract, which the court 
dismissed under Minnesota’s educational malpractice bar.284 The 
bar is practically insurmountable when a speech claim is based on 
contract law, particularly at sectarian colleges and universities where 
campus codes are entangled with religious doctrine.285 As a federal 
court explained when dismissing a claim alleging a college for 
Christian Scientists failed to honor various promises:  
Were the Court to wade into the issue of how closely 
Principia College operated within the constructs of the 
 279. See Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382 (Pa. 1981); State v. Schmid, 423 
A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980). 
 280. W. Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 515 
A.2d 1331, 1333 (Pa. 1986). 
 281. Abbariao v. Hamline Univ. Sch. of Law, 258 N.W.2d 108, 113 (Minn. 1977); 
see also Doe v. Univ. of St. Thomas, 240 F. Supp. 3d 984, 993 (D. Minn. 2017) (citing 
Abbariao, 258 N.W.2d at 112). 
282. Civ. No. 05-531, 2006 WL 3511795 (D. Minn. Dec. 6, 2006). 
283. Id. at *12. 
284. Id. at *13 (“Accordingly, the Court finds that the alleged specific promises 
in the Handbook did not create a contract, and Schumacher’s claim therefore fails 
as a matter of law. Thus, the Court dismisses Schumacher’s breach of contract 
claim.”). 
285. See, e.g., Gillis v. Principia Corp., 111 F. Supp. 3d 978, 983–86 (E.D. Mo. 
2015). 
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plethora of vague, general, and aspirational ‘mission 
statement-esque’ provisions cited by Plaintiff, the Court 
would be forced to engage—with complete disregard for 
Missouri law—in an educational malpractice analysis rife 
with the practical and policy concerns.286 
Several more practical barriers exist. Because contracts must be 
read as a whole,287 a court may not give priority to a speech-friendly 
provision while blue-penciling out speech-restrictive ones.288 
Contract damages are generally monetary.289 A student expelled for 
saying something controversial “would likely suffer economic harm 
arising from lost tuition, room and board, employment offers, and 
graduate school admissions.”290 But, “likely” is not good enough to 
withstand summary judgment. Damage claims premised on such 
“unsupported speculation” will be excluded from evidence.291 
Moreover, requesting non-monetary remedies such as an injunction 
or an order for specific performance risks asking a court to compel 
or restrict speech in ways that violate the First Amendment.292 
Finally, the proliferation of online and for-profit universities 
makes it practically impossible to use state constitutional law or 
common law to litigate contract-based speech claims. Students who 
study online come from many jurisdictions, and although 
forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses might be enforceable, so 
286. Id. at 985. 
 287. See, e.g., Flores v. Am. Seafoods Co., 335 F.3d 904, 910 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A] 
written contract must be read as a whole and every part interpreted with reference 
to the whole, with preference given to reasonable interpretations.” (quoting 
Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 
1999))). 
 288. See generally Bess v. Bothman, 257 N.W.2d 791, 794–95 (Minn. 1977) 
(defining and criticizing the “blue pencil” doctrine). 
289. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 346 (1981). 
290. Sarabyn, supra note 5, at 166 (emphasis added). 
291. Andler v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 670 F.3d 717, 727 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(“Departures from actual pre-injury earnings must be justified and cannot be 
unduly speculative.”). 
 292. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (discussing how compelled 
speech “invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First 
Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control” (quoting W. Va. 
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943))); Near v. Minnesota, 283 
U.S. 697, 714 (1931) (“[T]he main purpose of such constitutional provisions is ‘to 
prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by 
other governments.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 304, 313–14 
(Mass. 1825))). 
39
Aggergaard: The Question of Speech on Private Campuses and the Answer Nobody
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2018
668 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:2 
might mandatory arbitration clauses.293 Because for-profit 
corporations might claim reputational interests and fiduciary 
obligations that surpass those of nonprofit corporations, for-profit 
universities might choose aggressive responses to student lawsuits, 
just as Trump University did when asserting a defamation 
counterclaim in a student’s case alleging deceptive trade practices.294 
Of course, for-profit and online schools have speech codes 
too,295 but they have not drawn the ire of advocates at FIRE or much 
attention from scholars. In her book, Free Speech on Campus, 
Ben-Porath acknowledged that “online communication presents a 
growing set of challenges,” but she focused on social media and took 
the position that “online speech should be seen as separate from 
campus speech.”296 The problem with Ben-Porath’s approach is that 
“campuses” are only virtual at online schools, so online speech is the 
primary—if not exclusive—means of classroom instruction and 
discussion. Capella’s policies not only invite online expression on 
sensitive topics; they promote it. As a webpage titled “Diversity Makes 
a Difference at Capella” explains: “Students in a Capella business 
course may be asked to consider how Ramadan would affect sales of 
a product. Learners on a counseling track might be urged to think 
about how their future clients’ ethnic backgrounds or sexual 
orientation might inform their worldview.”297 Using contract law to 
adjudicate speech claims arising from online class participation on 
 293. See, e.g., Rosendahl v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., No. 11-cv-61, 2012 WL 
667049 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2012) (enforcing the arbitration clause of an executed 
enrollment agreement). 
294. Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 295. Cf. University Policies & Consumer Information, CAPELLA UNIV., 
https://www.capella.edu/content/dam/capella/PDF/policies/4.02.02.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2018) (forbidding “disrespect,” which is defined to include 
“harassing, threatening, or embarrassing others,” posting “racially, religiously, or 
ethnically offensive” material, and “disruptive conduct” that includes “threatening 
or belligerent language,” “lewd or indecent language or behavior,” and “inciting 
others to engage in disruptive conduct”); Student Handbook, WALDEN UNIV., 
http://catalog.waldenu.edu/content.php?catoid=41&navoid=5129 (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2018) (forbidding sexual harassment and unwelcomed “conduct or 
communication” directed toward another person that relates to “race, color, 
national origin, gender, sexual orientation, religion, age, mental or physical 
disability, veteran status, marital status, or other protected characteristics”). 
296. BEN-PORATH, supra note 34, at 78. 
297. Diversity Makes a Difference, CAPELLA UNIV. (Feb. 2, 2016), 
https://www.capella.edu/blogs/cublog/a-look-at-diversity-at-capella-university/. 
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culturally-sensitive topics runs head-on into the educational 
malpractice bar. 
Contract claims may be subject to internal university policies 
that disciplinary decisions are “final” and not subject to a court’s 
review.298 In 2016, the Third Circuit held that Capella’s finality policy 
“precludes appellate-like review of the merits of Capella’s 
disciplinary decision.”299 A federal court in the District of Oregon 
made a similar ruling with respect to Walden’s internal appellate 
procedures.300 The bottom line is that private colleges and 
universities stand in a starkly different position than public ones, and 
state law offers little practical help for those who advocate for 
speech-related legal protections on private campuses. 
C. Statutes Are Swallowed by the Sectarian Exception 
And then there are statutes that apply to private schools. At the 
time of this writing, only one such statute exists—California’s 
Leonard Law, enacted in 1992.301 As explained in Parts II and III, 
another California statute has been proposed.302 In his 1998 essay 
More Speech is Better, Chemerinsky voiced general support for 
speech-protective statutes to apply on private campuses.303 However, 
his most recent book, Free Speech on Campus, skirted the statutory 
issue.304 
Perhaps Chemerinsky ignored the speech-protective statute 
issue in his recent work because since 1998, the internet has 
revolutionized higher education in ways that make it highly doubtful 
that state statutes can meaningfully and fairly protect speech on 
 298. See, e.g., Reardon v. Allegheny Coll., 926 A.2d 477, 482–83, 482 n.5 (noting 
the parties’ agreement that “[t]he decision of the President is final” is adequate to 
insulate “‘private, internal decisions’ of the College” from external review). 
 299. See Mekuns v. Capella Educ. Co., 655 F. App’x 149, 150 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(addressing student dismissal for breach of University Policy 3.03.06, research 
misconduct). 
 300. Gibson v. Walden Univ. LLC, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1322, 1325–26 (D. Or. 2014) 
(noting the Walden Student Handbook “expressly declaims the formation of a 
contract”). 
 301. CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 94367 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 859 of 2017 
Reg. Sess.). 
302. See ACA 14, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017), https://leginfo.legislature.c 
a.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180ACA14; see supra notes 57, 244–
45 and accompanying text. 
303. Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 1643–44. 
304. See CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 18. 
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private campuses. Would California’s Leonard Law or the proposed 
California Campus Free Speech Act305 apply when a student who is 
not from the state studies online at a California university? Does the 
Leonard Law apply when a California resident studies outside the 
state? Regardless of how such questions are answered, students in 
different states could end up being treated unequally.  
A bigger problem of unequal treatment stems from the 
sectarian-school exceptions in the Leonard Law and the proposed 
California Campus Free Speech Act, exceptions that unquestionably 
would appear in any federal statute resembling Henry Hyde’s 
Collegiate Speech Protection Act.306 The exceptions enable actors at 
some private colleges and universities—but only the sectarian 
ones—to engage in exactly the sort of viewpoint discrimination 
R.A.V. forbids at public schools.307 
Some proponents for extending speech regulations to private 
campuses pay little, if any, attention to this unequal treatment. In 
The Shadow University, Kors and Silvergate lambasted nonsectarian 
universities but said little about sectarian schools other than citing 
their right “to enforce speech restrictions with bona fide religious 
purposes.”308 In 2010, a former fellow at FIRE described sectarian 
schools as “ideological universities” and likened them to “military 
academies” where “students’ reasonable expectations would be that 
they would have a more limited right to free speech at such an 
institution.”309 
Another group that advocates for students’ rights, the Student 
Press Law Center, attempted to put a positive spin on the unequal 
treatment by providing context that sectarian schools provide “each 
American an amazing diversity of choice to fit their unique interests 
and passions.”310 A page on the ACLU website titled “Speech on 
Campus” ignores the speech that occurs on private campuses—even 
nonsectarian ones—altogether,311 while another page on the website 
305. See ACA 14, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). 
 306. See Collegiate Speech Protection Act of 1991, H.R. 1380, 102d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (Cal. 1991). 
307. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (addressing bias-motivated 
expression). 
308. KORS & SILVERGATE, supra note 175, at 352. 
309. Sarabyn, supra note 5, at 178–81. 
310. DeWulf, supra note 31. 
311. Speech on Campus, ACLU.ORG, https://www.aclu.org/other/speech-campus 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2018). 
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titled “ACLU Defense of Religious Practice and Expression” explains 
the organization “vigorously defends the rights of all Americans to 
practice their religion.”312 Although the ACLU appears not to 
advocate for individuals’ rights to speak freely at sectarian colleges 
and universities, it defends the rights of individuals to proselytize at 
public ones.313 
The authors of the two books, both entitled Free Speech on 
Campus, analyzed colleges and universities broadly in a way that 
provided an incomplete picture of private education and therefore 
speech on private campuses. Ben-Porath’s suggestion in her book 
that “there is no need to accommodate religious or ideological 
objections to accepted knowledge”314 ignores that the government 
recognizes not only a need, but a right to such accommodations at 
sectarian institutions. Chemerinsky and Gillman broadly declare in 
their book that “censoring ideas” is “never permissible” and 
“campuses must be open to all ideas and views,”315 but they do not 
confront the fact that a sizable portion of private sectarian campuses 
are not so open. Chemerinsky and Gillman did consider a 
sectarian-related dilemma, but only in the context of whether a 
university (presumably a public one) could punish Christian 
students for expressing the belief that “traditional heterosexual 
marriage is the only true marriage.”316 
Assuming a Christian student is against gay marriage ignores 
that plenty of Christian students are for gay marriage,317 would like 
to say so (even at sectarian institutions), and would like to align 
themselves with the growing majority of Americans who support gay 
marriage.318 Ignoring those students and their schools, as virtually 
 312. ACLU Defense of Religious Practice and Expression, ACLU.ORG, 
https://www.aclu.org/aclu-defense-religious-practice-and-expression (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2018). 
313. ACLU Tells Virginia Community College System that Campus Demonstration 
Policies are Unconstitutional, ACLUVIRGINIA.ORG (Mar. 24, 2014), 
https://acluva.org/14911/aclu-tells-virginia-community-college-system-that-campu 
s-demonstration-policies-are-unconstitutional. 
314. BEN-PORATH, supra note 34, at xx. 
315. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 18, at 15, 83, 122–23, 132. 
316. Id. at 105. 
317. See Christians for Gay Rights, BROAD BLOGS (Sept. 9, 2011), 
https://broadblogs.com/2011/09/09/christians-for-gay-rights/ (“[S]ome 
Christian students were for gay marriage because they had learned how it would 
help families.”). 
318. Justin McCarthy, U.S. Support for Gay Marriage Edges to New High, GALLUP
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every analysis of campus speech has done,319 is a grave mistake given 
the increased growth and influence of sectarian institutions in the 
last few decades. Between 1980 and 2011, enrollment at “religiously 
affiliated” institutions grew 86%, compared with 60% at public 
institutions and 35% at “independent nonprofit” private 
institutions.320 “The religious identity of many private colleges and 
universities paled over the twentieth century, but in some settings, 
especially Catholic ones, the institutions’ religious identity gained 
renewed vigor.”321 
Meanwhile, sectarian institutions have sought and gained 
approval for speech-restrictive Title IX exemptions, with little 
scrutiny and apparently no litigation.322 If a federal speech bill 
becomes law, it would contain a sectarian exception, and it is false 
hope to expect courts to interpret and apply such an exception by 
analyzing the strength of schools’ sectarian connections. Courts have 
struggled with that sort of line-drawing for decades, particularly in 
Minnesota. In a 1982 decision, Larson v. Valente, the United States 
Supreme Court invalidated a Minnesota statute that required 
financial disclosures for churches that solicited more than half their 
funds from nonmembers.323 The Supreme Court held that the 
Minnesota law violated the “clearest command of the Establishment 
NEWS (May 15, 2017), http://www.gallup.com/poll/210566/support-gay-marriage-
edges-new-high.aspx (stating that sixty-four percent of Americans believe same-sex 
marriage should be legal). 
 319. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Jones, College Students Oppose Restrictions on Political Speech, 
GALLUP NEWS (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/190451/college-
students-oppose-restrictions-political-speech.aspx; Lydia Saad & Jeffrey M. Jones, 
More College Students than U.S. Adults Say Free Speech is Secure, GALLUP NEWS (Apr. 4, 
2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/190442/college-students-adults-say-free-
speech-secure.aspx. 
 320. See Digest of Education Statistics, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT.,
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d12/tables/dt12_231.asp (last visited Mar. 
20, 2018). 
 321. Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between Public and 
Private, Non-profit and Profit, and Secular and Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061, 1072 
(2000). 
322. Scott Jaschik, Education Dept. Releases Title IX Exemptions, Requests, INSIDE
HIGHER EDUC. (May 2, 2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/ 
quicktakes/2016/05/02/education-dept-releases-title-ix-exemptions-requests; see 
also supra Part II.B. 
323. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982). 
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Clause,” which is “that one religious denomination cannot be 
officially preferred over another.”324 
Eight years later, the “command” arose again in Minnesota 
when a federal district court confronted whether the state violated 
the Establishment Clause by paying for eleventh- and twelfth-graders 
to attend eight private colleges and universities with varying 
sectarian ties.325 To determine the strength of each school’s sectarian 
connections, the court identified nine “difficult to follow” Supreme 
Court cases and pieced together a thirty-six-part test for determining 
whether a college or university is “pervasively sectarian.”326 The 
resulting published decision, Minnesota Federation of Teachers v. 
Nelson, was not broadly cited and was described by the General 
Counsel to the National Conference of Catholic Bishops as 
“cumbersome.”327 
In 1998, the sectarian exemption question surfaced again in 
Columbia Union College v. Clarke, when the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals confronted whether a college affiliated with the Seventh Day 
Adventist Church was “pervasively sectarian.”328 The United States 
Supreme Court denied review, which drew a dissent from Justice 
Clarence Thomas, who urged the court to “scrap” its “pervasively 
sectarian” Agostini test.329  
A year later, Justice Thomas wrote for a four-member plurality 
that all but rejected the Agostini test in the context of state funding 
for a sectarian elementary and secondary school.330 That case, 
Mitchell v. Helms, was argued in the Supreme Court by Michael W. 
McConnell, then a professor at the University of Utah College of 
324. Id. at 255; see id. at 244. 
325. See Minn. Fed’n of Teachers v. Nelson, 740 F. Supp. 694, 696 (D. Minn. 
1990). 
 326. Id. at 709, 714 n.3, 718 (noting tests that include whether some classes 
begin with prayer and whether mandatory theology or religion courses “are taught 
with a taint of religious indoctrination”). 
 327. Mark E. Chopko, Religious Access to Public Programs and Governmental 
Funding, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 645, 667 n.101 (1992). 
328. Columbia Union Coll. v. Clarke, 159 F.3d 151, 162–63 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 329. Columbia Union Coll. v. Clarke, 527 U.S. 1013, 1013 (1999) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting); see Columbia Union Coll. v. Clarke, 159 F.3d at 157–58 (reaffirming the 
“Agostini directive,” which combined the “‘effect’ and ‘entanglement’ prongs” of the 
Lemon test into a “single ‘effect’ inquiry”); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 
(1997). 
330. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 808, 826–27 (2000) (“In this case, the 
inquiry under Agostini’s purpose and effect test is a narrow one.”). 
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Law, who was appointed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals two 
years later.331 In Colorado Christian University v. Weaver, Judge 
McConnell delivered a significant blow to the “pervasively sectarian” 
test, writing that the state of Colorado violated the Establishment 
Clause when it denied scholarships to students on grounds that the 
school they attended was “pervasively sectarian.”332 Judge 
McConnell’s case law authority in Colorado Christian included 
Columbia Union College, Larson, and the Mitchell case he argued in the 
United States Supreme Court.333 “The Colorado law seems even 
more problematic than the Minnesota law invalidated in Larson,” he 
wrote.334 “The Minnesota law at least was framed in terms of secular 
considerations: how much money was raised internally and how 
much from outsiders to the institution.”335 
In affirming the flow of state money to Colorado Christian 
University, the Tenth Circuit panel was untroubled by the school’s 
“Lifestyle Covenant Agreement,” which required students to follow 
“the example of Jesus Christ and the teachings of the Bible.”336 The 
court described the agreement as regulating “conduct, not belief.”337 
However, in her 2017 article, Hubertz singled out Colorado 
Christian University’s code as speech-restrictive because it forbade 
“defending or advocating a homosexual lifestyle.”338 
Commentary on Colorado Christian was mixed.339 What does 
seem clear is that the United States Supreme Court appears on the 
verge of holding that any sectarian connection is enough to exempt 
private schools from a host of federal laws, and a speech statute 
would be among them. The schools would receive an additional 
 331. See id. at 800; Michael W. McConnell, STAN. L. SCH., https://www-
cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/McConnell-Michael-CV-7.5.1 
6.pdf.
332. 534 F.3d 1245, 1253 (10th Cir. 2008).
333. See id. at 1258–59.
334. Id. at 1259.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 1252.
337. Id.
338. Hubertz, supra note 58, at 187–88.
339. Compare Richard F. Duncan, The “Clearest Command” of the Establishment
Clause: Denominational Preferences, Religious Liberty, and Public Scholarships that Classify 
Religions, 55 S.D. L. REV. 390, 410 (2010) (supporting the Colorado Christian University 
holding), with Recent Case, Tenth Circuit Strikes Down Colorado Law Exempting 
“Pervasively Sectarian” Religious Colleges from State Scholarship Program, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 1255, 1262 (2009) (criticizing the Colorado Christian University holding). 
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shield from the proposed “First Amendment Defense Act,” which 
was a direct response to Obergefell v. Hodges,340 in which the United 
States Supreme Court affirmed a fundamental right for same-sex 
couples to marry.341 As Hubertz explains, “Evangelical colleges are 
fighting hard against the implications of Obergefell.”342 Potentially, 
under Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,343 even a for-profit university, 
online or otherwise, could try to claim an exemption from a speech 
statute since the corporation Hobby Lobby could claim a sectarian 
connection.344 
At this time, corporations remain a wildcard. As Airbnb, 
GoDaddy, and Google demonstrated before and after the 
Charlottesville tragedy, sometimes corporations can and will take 
stands the government cannot take, not only against white 
supremacy, 345 but in favor of GLBT rights. “Corporate America’s 
evolution on gay rights appears to have reached a tipping point, one 
where so many companies have taken a stand on the issue that the 
risk of speaking out has been superseded by the risk of not doing 
so.”346 
V. WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN: EDUCATION, NOT LAWS 
This article has considered whether the law can or should 
protect speech on private college and university campuses, as it does 
340. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 341. Jonathan Rauch, Gay Rights, Religious Liberty, and Nondiscrimination: Can a 
Train Wreck Be Avoided?, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1195, 1195, 1195 n.2 (2017) (citing H.R. 
2802, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 1598, 114th Cong. (2015)); see also Obergefell, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2607–08. 
342. Hubertz, supra note 58, at 168. 
343. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
344. Id. (affirming for-profit employer’s exemption from providing health 
insurance for procedures and medications the employer found religiously 
objectionable). “Hobby Lobby is a sweeping decision that threatens to turn [the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993] into a law that—instead of protecting 
religious freedom—allows religious believers to force their faiths on others in a 
variety of ways.” Alex J. Luchenitser, Symposium, Religious Accommodation in the Age 
of Civil Rights: A New Era of Inequality? Hobby Lobby and Religious Exemptions from 
Anti-Discrimination Laws, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 63, 63 (2015). 
345. See Swenson, supra note 275; Mettler & Selk; supra note 276. 
 346. Jena McGregor, Corporate America’s Embrace of Gay Rights Has Reached a 
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on public campuses. On the question of whether it can do so, the 
article has explained that the practical barriers are significant. 
Federal judges will not alter the state action doctrine cavalierly, 
contract law is a bad fit for enforcing speech-protective provisions in 
campus codes, and state statutes are unworkable in an era of online 
and for-profit education. 
Regarding whether the law should do so, it is a confusing issue 
that has come at a most confusing and contentious time. There 
clearly is an appetite and a market for considering the question, 
evidenced by two books titled Free Speech on Campus being published 
as the 2017–2018 school year began.347 Unfortunately, the books do 
not help answer the question because they provide a perspective that 
all universities are the same348 when, legally, they most certainly are 
not.  
The authors of Free Speech on Campus did not have the 
opportunity to consider the speech at the University of Virginia, 
which for much of the nation was a game-changer349 in the way that 
R.A.V.’s cross-burning was for much of St. Paul.350 Under the current 
law, the public university was relatively powerless when the white 
supremacists brought their torches. A private university, by contrast, 
has more legal tools to snuff out hate. Private corporations have 
earned credibility too, for now at least.351 If there ever was a time to 
advocate for the law to regulate speech on private campuses, this is 
not it. 
But this is a good time for reflection across the political 
spectrum. Progressives would benefit from listening to civil 
libertarians, who wisely caution against trusting those in power. 
Progressives would also benefit from acknowledging that sometimes 
corporations, even for-profit educators, can play positive roles in 
diversity and speech. Meanwhile, civil libertarians and others who 
advocate for students’ individual rights risk losing credibility by not 
confronting the government-endorsed viewpoint discrimination that 
is occurring under Title IX, to the detriment of individual students. 
347. See BEN-PORATH, supra note 34; CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 18. 
 348. See BEN-PORATH, supra note 34, at 8; CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 
18, at 113. 
349. Cf. Stolberg & Rosenthal, supra note 11. 
350. See Cleary, supra note 10. 
351. See, e.g., McGregor, supra note 346 (describing how a swelling tide of 
corporations have, with public credibility, set the tone for GLBT rights advocacy). 
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As for social conservatives, they have valid points about the value 
of minority views and the danger of excluding them. But they, too, 
ignore that minority views are excluded from some sectarian colleges 
and universities. Too many social conservatives did too little to 
prevent the harassment of speakers such as Princeton’s 
Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, who faced threats of being “lynched, shot 
and raped” after Fox News aired thirty seconds of a commencement 
address in which she criticized, of all people, the President of the 
United States.352 As she wrote in the New York Times: “When it comes 
to protecting the speech of people who are most vulnerable to being 
intimidated into silence—like people of color and gay people—
conservatives either are suspiciously quiet or drive further 
intimidation with wildly negative news coverage.”353 
As for students and student activists in particular, they need to 
learn the basic lesson that shouting down controversial speakers and 
defacing a Muslim students’ bridge mural with “ISIS” are not speech. 
They are acts—sometimes criminal ones. On this issue, Chemerinsky 
and Gillman were spot-on: “There is, of course, no First Amendment 
right to destroy someone else’s property, even if it is done to 
communicate a message.”354 “There is no First Amendment right to 
disrupt classes or other campus activities.”355 Plainly, more education 
about freedom of speech is needed, and not only in law schools or 
even colleges. As the authors explain, today’s traditional-age 
students constitute “the first generation of students educated, from 
a young age, not to bully,” but they know “little about the history of 
free speech in the United States” and lack “awareness of how 
important free speech had been to vulnerable political 
minorities.”356 
The efforts to increase awareness should focus not only on the 
First Amendment, but also on the Fourteenth Amendment. By its 
plain language, the First Amendment limits only “Congress,”357 and 
the principles underlying its Speech Clause extend to state and local 
actors only because the United States Supreme Court decided free 
speech is embodied by the Fourteenth Amendment’s assurance of 
352. Taylor, supra note 52. 
353. Id. 
354. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 18, at 123. 
355. Id. 
356. Id. at 10. 
357. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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liberty.358 Freedom from speech restrictions is a cherished liberty 
interest, but so is being free from homophobia, sex and gender 
discrimination, and racial hate. If the pictures from Charlottesville 
taught us anything, it is that untold numbers of Americans—
including apparently white college-aged ones in the racial majority—
do not have the foggiest idea what the Fourteenth Amendment 
stands for. 
After Charlottesville, the question of whether the law can or 
should protect or regulate speech on private colleges and 
universities became even more difficult. At this writing, the answer is 
one that free-speech advocates probably do not want to hear. As 
Simpson College Professor Brian Steffen put it: “A private university, 
in many respects, more accurately resembles a benevolent 
dictatorship than it does a democratic community.”359 When the 
speakers come to campus bearing torches, the dictatorship can be as 
much a blessing as a curse. 
358. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931). 
359. Steffen, supra note 257, at 172. 
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